

1 Title: An Evolutionary Approach to Privacy and Information-Management Psychology

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15 Abstract: Current debates concerning the use of digital technology often focus on privacy, yet privacy attitudes and
16 behavior are remarkably under-theorized, and relatively little empirical research has investigated privacy beyond the
17 realm of digital communications. Building on evolutionary scholarship on information exchange, we outline a
18 theoretical model in which cultural concepts of privacy reflect the workings of evolved psychological mechanisms
19 that aim to regulate others' access to fitness-relevant information towards adaptive ends. Results of two initial U.S.
20 vignette studies distributed via Prolific (n=425, 120) support the core predictions of this model, suggesting that
21 people may have implicit and unstated assumptions regarding how information spreads in social environments.
22 Specifically, participants' privacy evaluations were predicted by whether information was intentionally acquired, the
23 extent to which information was transmitted, and an individual's position in an information transfer event.
24 Importantly, how information was acquired and the nature of its transmission constituted independent but
25 interacting influences on privacy perceptions. Additionally, results suggest the location within shared social
26 networks of the individual to whom information is transmitted is used as a proxy for the potential costs of
27 dissemination.

28

29 Social Media summary: We argue concepts of privacy reflect evolved information-management psychology and
30 mental models of information flow.

31

32 **1.0 Introduction**

33 Concerns over privacy are central to contemporary debates surrounding digital technology. A 2019 study
34 found most U.S. residents express unease about how their data are used by corporate and governmental agencies
35 (Auxier et al., 2019). Coupled with dramatic advancements in information technologies, such concern has inspired
36 extensive research on privacy attitudes and privacy-related behavior online. Largely absent from this work is an
37 analysis of what privacy is and why privacy exists *outside* of relatively novel digital environments. Noting that the
38 privacy concept extends far beyond the context of digital technology, a few scholars of online behavior have
39 highlighted the concept’s seemingly deep roots in antiquity, and some have even discussed the possibility of an
40 evolutionary basis for the cultural concept (Acquisti et al., 2015, 2022; Shariff et al., 2021).

41 Here, we build on digital privacy researchers’ conjectures regarding the deep history of privacy concepts, as well
42 as evolutionary scholarship on the transmission of information, to propose an evolutionary approach to studying
43 privacy. Specifically, while a large amount of research has considered how individuals acquire knowledge from
44 others, the converse scenario, in which the individual attempts to restrict others’ information acquisition, has
45 received considerably less attention despite being a plausibly recurrent evolutionary challenge. Information here
46 can be defined as sensory input that, once processed, results in some reduction of uncertainty (Scott-Phillips,
47 2008). Considering this dimension of cultural transmission, we propose that cultural concepts of privacy reflect
48 mental models of information flow, or internalized representations of how information moves in the social
49 environment (Westbrook, 2006). These mental models of information flow are shaped by universal psychological
50 mechanisms that evolved via natural selection to regulate information dissemination. We outline key components
51 of this framework and present the results of two initial studies designed to examine some of its components. We
52 argue this perspective can shed critical light on digital privacy research—which has often produced inconsistent
53 findings regarding the extent to which individuals value privacy in online environments (Kokolakis, 2017)—as well
54 as a diversity of privacy concepts and privacy-related behaviors.

55

56 1.1 Outlining an Evolved Psychology of Information Management

57 Privacy is a difficult concept to pin down, as it spans a wide swath of domains (Solove, 2009). The term
58 generally describes an individual or group’s ability to seclude themselves from others or be free from the attention
59 or observation of others, including freedom from unwelcome literal or figurative intrusions (Longman Dictionary
60 of Contemporary English, n.d., Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Consonant with such definitions, accounts of privacy-
61 related behavior in humans indicate that one commonality connecting many different types of privacy is
62 consideration of what information others have access to, with concerns often centering on avoidance of watchful
63 eyes and listening ears. For example, studying U.S. college students, Pedersen (1997) explores the psychological
64 functions of such types of privacy as solitude, isolation, and anonymity. Interviewing women in Durban, South
65 Africa regarding privacy, Scorgie et al. (2016) describe participants’ emphasis on the importance of visually
66 obscuring evidence that one has menstruated. Limbago et al.’s (2025) Finnish university participants cite

67 uncertainty about others' ability to overhear conversations as a primary factor inhibiting socializing in virtual-reality
68 settings.

69 Taken together, privacy concerns often strikingly parallel behaviors clearly aimed at moderating
70 information flow, such as monitoring other animals' gaze direction, or sensitivity to auditory cues produced by
71 conspecifics (Bateman & Fleming, 2011; Heffner, 1998). Our understanding of privacy attitudes and behavior may
72 thus benefit from a consideration of how humans and other organisms have responded to the adaptive challenge
73 of regulating information dissemination, including their attempts to control who is able to acquire, and potentially
74 transmit, any given piece of information about them. Before turning to this question, however, we must first
75 consider the advantages of acquiring information.

76

77 *1.1.1 Humans Seek Out Information About Others*

78 The ability to obtain information about the physical and social environment can be an important
79 determinant of fitness, informing decision making in many domains. Information acquisition can arise from asocial
80 interactions with the environment, such as trial-and-error learning, or via social learning influenced by observation
81 of, or interaction with, others (Heyes, 1994). Social learning is widespread in the animal kingdom, as it can reduce
82 the time, energy, and opportunity costs associated with individual learning. Humans are heavily dependent on
83 social learning for survival and reproduction, relying on skill-intensive food acquisition strategies which often
84 involve learning a body of accumulated socially-transmitted information that would be impossible to accrue
85 individually (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Dean et al., 2014). Additionally, human behavioral strategies are dependent
86 on cooperation with kin and non-kin, as well as coordinating collective action, all of which hinge on imitative
87 capacities to learn and adhere to social norms (Cosmides et al., 2010).

88 In addition to acquiring skills, knowledge about the environment, and cultural information, humans are
89 adept at acquiring information about other people. Experimental studies indicate participants transmit social
90 information with greater accuracy and in larger quantities than non-social information (Mesoudi et al., 2006;
91 Stubbersfield et al., 2015). Information about others is obtained for many reasons, two of which are important
92 here: to discriminate among potential models in the context of social learning, and to discriminate among potential
93 cooperative partners.

94 Social learners are selective in whom they learn from in order to minimize the risk of, and costs associated
95 with, learning inaccurate or irrelevant information. Theoretical and empirical work indicate individuals have
96 context-dependent preferences for potential models based on characteristics such as age, social status, expertise,
97 and success (Atkisson et al., 2012; Chudek et al., 2012; Henrich & Broesch, 2011; Wood et al., 2016). For example,
98 studies show that children preferentially imitate behavior based on the age and gender of models (Lew-Levy et al.,
99 2023). Likewise, Henrich and Henrich (2010) report pregnant Fijian women preferentially learn food taboos from
100 older and locally prestigious women. Generally, the presence of model-biased transmission patterns suggests a
101 sensitivity to cues pertinent to discerning such characteristics about others as age, status, or expertise.

102 Information about others is also obtained to discriminate among potential cooperative partners. Because
103 cooperating with free riders can erode the adaptive benefits of cooperation as a strategy, the capacity to correctly
104 identify who is and who is not a beneficial cooperative partner is of great importance. In kin-selected cooperation
105 systems, cooperators must discriminate between kin and non-kin to preferentially provide aid to kin (Stevens et al.,
106 2005; West et al., 2007). In models of direct reciprocity, individuals must be able to discriminate between
107 cooperators and defectors, keeping track of past interactions and estimating future interactions with multiple
108 different partners over long periods of time (Delton et al., 2011; Lehmann & Keller, 2006). In indirect reciprocity
109 systems, individuals must do still more, tracking the behavior of all others in the social network to discriminate
110 among partners based on past behavior as cooperators or defectors (Manrique et al., 2021). The aggregated beliefs
111 and evaluative judgements made about someone constitute their reputation (Wu et al., 2016a). In systems of
112 indirect reciprocity where actors do not directly observe the actions of others, decisions regarding whom to
113 cooperate with are made on the basis of the other's reputation as a good cooperator (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005).

114 Employing language, humans engage in fully referential and displaced communication (i.e. communication
115 that is 'about' something, and can refer to things not immediately present) (Rendall et al., 2009). Gossip is
116 ubiquitous and frequent in human societies (Beersma & Van Kleef, 2012; Robbins & Karan, 2020), proving a rich
117 source of information about others' past behavior in cooperative endeavors (Dunbar, 2004; Pan et al., 2024);
118 correspondingly, information gleaned from gossip is used when selecting cooperative partners (Piazza & Bering,
119 2008; Sommerfeld et al., 2007). For example, in a cross-cultural study of Mechanical Turk workers and Ngandu
120 horticulturalists, Hess and Hagen (2023) find that participants informed of negatively-valanced information about a
121 hypothetical target are less likely to transfer resources to the target; notably, this effect is mediated by the extent to
122 which the information affected the target's reputation.

124 1.1.2 Humans Also Limit What Knowledge Others Can Learn About Them

125 As the cursory overview above indicates, a substantial body of work is dedicated to understanding how
126 and under what conditions individuals benefit by acquiring information from—and about—others. Comparatively
127 less has been said regarding the flip side of this situation, namely contexts in which individuals benefit by limiting
128 others' ability to learn about them. However, ample empirical and theoretical work suggests this topic may play a
129 similarly significant role in governing human communication.

130 Studies of non-human animal communication reveal that moderating other organisms' access to
131 information is a widespread adaptive challenge. For example, though not intended to convey information, cues are
132 nonetheless an information source for other organisms. Danchin et al. (2004) use the term *inadvertent social*
133 *information* to describe cues that, when observed by nearby organisms, provide valuable information about the
134 environment, such as the location or quality of nearby resources. For the animal producing the cue, others'
135 vicarious information acquisition can be costly. Predators may be alerted to an organism's presence, or competitors
136 may discover the location of a food cache. Correspondingly, researchers have demonstrated that numerous species
137 monitor and attempt to manipulate what information other organisms can acquire. Carter et al. (2008) show that

138 starlings monitor other animals' cranial orientation, the presence of eyes, and gaze direction as indices of predation
139 risk. Leaver et al. (2007) report Eastern grey squirrels preferentially dig their caches when oriented away from
140 conspecifics, potentially limiting others' ability to pilfer. Hare et al. (2000) present research indicating common
141 chimpanzees display some understanding of conspecifics' knowledge about the environment, and utilize this to
142 gain advantages in competitive situations.

143 Humans face adaptive challenges related to information management similar to those of other animals,
144 such as predator avoidance and the strategic acquisition of food resources. However, humans' capacity for
145 symbolic communication allows a far larger quantity of information to be transmitted between conspecifics,
146 marking a point of departure from the informational ecosystems of other social animals (Gärdenfors, 2004). As
147 discussed above, information about the behavior of group members flows through gossip networks. Combined
148 with reputation-based systems of cooperation, this means that information management is a significant, uniquely
149 complex concern for humans (Wu et al., 2016a).

150 When resource allocation is determined by one's reputation, it pays to be strategic regarding others'
151 perception of oneself. Costly signaling theories of cooperation highlight this reality: one need not engage in costly
152 forms of prosociality at all times, but should instead preferentially do so when potential observers are present
153 (Gintis et al., 2001; Van Vugt & Hardy, 2010) and likely to gossip (Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011; Piazza & Bering,
154 2008). By the same logic, we should expect individuals to preferentially engage in reputationally damaging behavior
155 when others are absent, or, if present, when others are unlikely to spread information through gossip networks. We
156 may also expect individuals to limit sharing information that poses a reputational risk.

157 Because the realm of reputationally salient information can span innumerable domains, it is difficult to
158 specify a priori exactly what forms of information any given culture will consider reputationally impactful (Garfield
159 et al., 2021). However, it is plausible that key areas related to fitness, such as social status (von Rueden et al., 2010),
160 somatic capital (Lancaster & Kaplan, 2010), prosociality (Jaeggi et al., 2010), honesty (Gintis et al., 2001), sexual
161 behavior (Scelza, 2022), alliances (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009), and resources (Borgerhoff Mulder & Beheim, 2011)
162 are common domains. Indeed, at a proximate level, individuals may not have access to the full suite of social
163 norms to which they may be held to account (Kelly & Davis, 2018). It is thus plausible that individuals opt for a
164 cautious strategy, being hesitant regarding what information they share with others to prevent potentially damaging
165 information from being learned and transmitted. Furthermore, individuals may use situational cues, such as the
166 presence of others, and the likelihood of future information transmission, to aid in evaluating when information
167 management concerns should take priority.

168 Human sensitivity to the presence of others is evident in audience effects, changes in behavior when one
169 believes they are being observed by another person (Hamilton & Lind, 2016). A fMRI study by Somerville et al.
170 (2013) found participants who believed a camera was transmitting a feed of their face to a friend outside the
171 scanner evinced increased medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activation and striatum-mPFC connectivity when a
172 signal indicated the camera was on. The mPFC is associated with complex social cognition and self-referential
173 processing (Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004), while the striatum is associated with reward

174 processing (Delgado, 2007). A similar study by Izuma et al. (2010) found both neural regions were active when
175 participants engaged in a task evaluating their adherence to various social norms within view of other people.
176 Taken together, such studies suggest humans have deeply engrained psychological mechanisms for information
177 management.

178 Empirical work also indicates individuals are responsive to the potential downstream impacts of gossip
179 (Nieper et al., 2022). Wu et al. (2016b) find individuals are sensitive to the social connectivity of observers, and
180 behave more generously in conditions where observers can gossip to more people. Nieper et al. (2025) report
181 participants are less likely to engage in dishonest behavior when observed by individuals who can gossip to future
182 interaction partners as opposed to those who cannot.

183 These lines of evidence suggest the socio-informational environment humans occupy, wherein
184 cooperation is critical to success, jockeying for advantage often occurs, and reputational information is a critical
185 resource, plausibly selected for psychological mechanisms designed to attend to and regulate the dissemination of
186 information towards broadly adaptive ends. We thus propose that people's concepts of privacy, and the
187 deployment of those concepts in judgment and decision making, should reflect three distinct but interacting
188 capacities, namely the ability to monitor and regulate:

189 **A) Others' acquisition of information:** an individual's ability to assess the likelihood that others will
190 acquire information in the future, as well as the actuality of any current information acquisition.

191 **B) Others' transmission of information:** an individual's ability to assess the probable extent of
192 transmission beyond the initial acquirer, possibly considering the content of the information, social norms
193 regarding transmission, and (if known) the identity of the person acquiring the information.

194 **C) Consequences of information dissemination:** the ability to assess whether dissemination (hereafter
195 used to refer to any combination of acquisition and/or transmission) will be costly or beneficial given
196 both one's position in an information transfer event and the content of the information. This also
197 includes the ability to assess, based on the identity of the individual to whom the information is
198 transmitted, the likelihood and ramifications of further transmission.

199 In this framework, people's conceptualizations of privacy, centrally concerned with regulating the
200 information to which others have access, should reflect mental models of how information spreads in the social
201 environment. These models constitute an individual's internal representation of the social world, including their
202 expectations about the shape and structure of social networks, and assumptions about how information travels
203 through those networks (Westbrook, 2006). We propose these models are, in turn, shaped by the aforementioned
204 cognitive capacities to monitor and regulate others' acquisition and transmission of information and the
205 downstream consequences of information flow. This framework provides an empirical and evolutionarily
206 grounded foundation for theories of privacy that state individuals should feel their privacy has been breached when
207 information flow exceeds an anticipated or accepted extent (Nissenbaum, 2009).

208 Common definitions of privacy as solitude, or as being free from the observation of others, can be
209 understood in this framework via the first two components, monitoring the acquisition and transmission of

210 information. In terms of the third component, it is worth considering both how a variety of factors might
211 influence the risk of negative consequences and how human psychology is designed to estimate those
212 consequences when making decisions. Costs of dissemination may include direct bodily harm (as in the case of
213 violence), reputational harms, or material harms (which may, themselves, be downstream of reputational harms).
214 The dissemination of information regarding certain actions, such as defection in cooperation, sexual infidelity, or
215 murder of kin, may pose a significant risk of negative consequences regardless of cultural group. Nevertheless,
216 even in a simplified model of human social interactions, such as a multi-shot interaction game, context looms large.
217 Defection against a cooperator may lead to sanctioning, whereas defection against a defector may be permitted or
218 even rewarded as a form of norm enforcement (Andrés Guzmán et al., 2007; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003).
219 Because context matters, at a proximate level individuals are likely to rely on socially transmitted norms, stories,
220 and knowledge of what consequences have befallen past norm violators as heuristics to approximate the potential
221 costs of disseminating any given piece of information. It should therefore be understood that, while the above
222 theory predicts overarching similarities in cultural concepts of privacy across groups/societies, it in no way predicts
223 uniformity in this regard, and, indeed, given the centrality of culture as a determinant of the meaning of actions
224 and characteristics, extensive variation across cultures in privacy concepts is to be expected.

225 As discussed above, as an obligate social and cultural species, obtaining more information about the
226 physical and social environment generally promotes human fitness. However, while gathering information is
227 frequently profitable, it is not always in one's best interests to divulge information, especially reputationally harmful
228 information that could decrease one's access to shared resources and cooperative partners. Therefore, there is a
229 clash of interests governing information management, as an individual's incentives to carefully regulate the flow of
230 information about themselves are often in direct conflict with others' incentives to acquire information they
231 possess. Hess and Hagen (2019) suggest that societies can be expected to sanction gossip less than physical
232 aggression because the benefits obtained by group members from gossip outweigh the risk that reputationally
233 damaging information about any one individual will be disseminated.

234 Moreover, it seems likely that cultural evolutionary processes likely favor cultural models of privacy that
235 standardize social norms about what information is or is not appropriate to acquire and spread, facilitating
236 coordination and cooperation by balancing the utility of gossip against the costs of conflict. Culturally sanctioned
237 forms of information guarding, such as sexual modesty, may be examples of such equilibria. In the United States
238 cultural context, the single-family home is such a site of equilibria. The U.S. legal system designates the home as a
239 site specially protected from governmental intrusion (*Kyllo v. United States*, 2001), and it is common for homes to
240 utilize features such as walls, hedges, or fences to facilitate information guarding (Day, 2000). More generally,
241 restrictions on whom it is appropriate to tell what information may also serve a similar purpose, for example, by
242 constraining dissemination to kin or cooperative partners, thereby both maximizing the benefits of information
243 sharing and minimizing the associated risks.

244 It should be emphasized that, although we assume some degree of domain specificity in human evolved
245 psychology, our proposed framework is also compatible with a general-purpose learning mechanism. Many topics

246 in the evolutionary social sciences are the subject of debates between those arguing for domain specificity and
247 those championing general-purpose learning, but the merits of these positions are beyond the scope of this paper.
248 Moreover, while an extensive discussion of cultural evolution is likewise beyond the scope of this paper, it is highly
249 likely that processes of cultural evolution play a key role in shaping ideas of privacy. The evolved information
250 management psychology discussed above plausibly constitutes cognitive factors of attraction (Buskell, 2017),
251 biasing the generation and transmission of cultural variants of privacy concepts towards these psychological
252 predispositions, while cultural models of privacy that facilitate coordination and cooperation likely arise through
253 processes of cultural group selection.

254

255 **2.0 Study Overview**

256 If cultural concepts of privacy are underpinned by evolved information-management psychology, then
257 notions of privacy should reflect this psychology, such that an individual feels their privacy has been breached
258 when information is acquired and/or transmitted beyond an expected or desired extent. Accordingly, moral and
259 emotional judgments concerning situations bearing on issues of privacy—judgments constituting operationalized
260 models of privacy—should center on the evaluation of information acquisition and transmission, as well as the
261 potential consequences of information dissemination.

262 Below, we present two vignette-based studies designed to explore some of the core features of our
263 theoretical model by testing whether situational features of a social interaction predict privacy judgements. In Study
264 1, we consider how three independent variables—how information was acquired (“Manner of Acquisition” or
265 “Acquisition”), the extent to which it was transmitted (“Transmission”), and the relative position of the participant
266 in the information transfer event (“Position”)—affect explicit judgments of privacy, as well as participants’ moral
267 judgments and emotional responses. Each of the three independent variables represents a feature of information
268 transfer events that is theoretically central to evolved information-management psychology. We manipulate
269 Transmission via a within-subjects design, while Acquisition and Position are between-subjects. In Study 2 we
270 conduct a partial replication to test the effect of Transmission in a between-subjects design, using a select subset of
271 the vignettes used in Study 1.

272 Because the nature of the information at issue plays a significant role in concepts of privacy, we kept this
273 feature constant across conditions and studies to better detect the impact of situational factors on perceptions of
274 privacy. In each vignette, the information in question was described simply as “personal medical information.” The
275 reasons for this choice were twofold. First, we sought to employ a type of information that lacked negative
276 reputational valence, as such valence might bias responses. Simultaneously, information that is banal or otherwise
277 lacked any potential risk would confuse participants. Personal medical information is commonly considered private
278 in the United States (the population of study), and neither possession of one's own personal medical information
279 nor attempting to limit its dissemination are likely to be seen as indicating a norm violation or moral failure on the
280 part of the first party.

281 In each vignette, the information in question was described simply as “personal medical information.” As
282 the current study focuses on how individuals use situational cues to calculate privacy risk, and not on comparisons
283 among different forms of information, information with a clear reputational valence risked biasing responses. At
284 the same time, information that was banal or otherwise lacked any potential risk would confuse participants.
285 Personal medical information was chosen because this type of information is commonly considered private in the
286 United States (the population of study), and neither possession of one’s own personal medical information nor
287 attempting to limit its dissemination are likely to be seen as indicating a norm violation or moral failure on the part
288 of the first party.

289

290 **3.0 Study 1**

291 We sought to measure how select features of an information transfer event, each theoretically central to
292 evolved information management psychology, affect U.S. crowdsourced participants’ privacy perceptions. In Study
293 1, using a mixed between- and within-subjects design, we created vignettes varying the (i) manner of information
294 acquisition, (ii) extent of information transmission, and (iii) relative position of the participant in the information
295 transfer event.

296

297 3.1 Study 1 Predictions

298 To evaluate our theoretical model, we tested four pre-registered predictions (see <https://osf.io/2kgwx/>).

299

300 *H1: The manner in which information is acquired, specifically the intentionality of the acquirer, will influence judgments of privacy and*
301 *related reactions.*

302 Previous research has shown that intentionality plays an important, albeit culturally and contextually
303 variable, role in moral judgments (Barrett et al., 2016). If notions of privacy are rooted in the utility of regulating
304 what others know, then a second party’s (Person B’s) intentional efforts to access information without the first
305 party’s (Person A’s) consent should be viewed as inflicting an unwelcome cost. Additionally, if individuals use
306 situational cues to evaluate when information-management concerns should take priority, voluntary disclosure of
307 information may be one cue indicating decreased risk of reputational or other harm. We therefore predict that
308 intentional acquisition of information from Person A without their consent will be judged as more wrong, more
309 harmful, causing greater discomfort, and a greater violation of privacy than unintentional acquisition of
310 information or information acquisition via Person A’s voluntary disclosure.

311

312 *H2: Information transmission to a third party will result in more severe judgments of a privacy violation and related reactions.*

313 The costs of dissemination increase with each additional person to whom information is transmitted.
314 Each person is both a potential competitor or cooperative partner whose future behavior could be influenced by
315 acquired information, as well as a new node in the transmission chain, multiplying the possibility of future
316 transmission. Empirical evidence suggests individuals may be sensitive to the possibility of future transmission

317 when being observed (Nieper et al., 2025). If concepts of privacy are shaped by evolved information-management
318 psychology, then the risk incurred via transmission will be reflected in privacy perceptions such that subsequent
319 transmission to a third party (i.e., from Person B to Person C) will be viewed as more wrong, more harmful,
320 causing greater discomfort, and a greater violation of privacy.

321

322 *H3: Information transmission to a third party who shares social networks with the first party will be regarded as a greater violation of*
323 *privacy than transmission to socially unconnected third parties.*

324 Evaluating the consequences of information dissemination is a central component of the postulated
325 evolved information-management psychology. For most of human history, transmission to individuals within one's
326 social network likely entailed higher risks than transmission to socially unconnected individuals, as, within one's
327 network, cooperative partners who obtain negative information may withhold resources or support, competitors
328 may gain an edge, and hostile individuals may cause greater harm. Additionally, the likelihood of further
329 transmission occurring is greater via socially connected than socially unconnected individuals (Lind et al., 2007;
330 Miritello et al., 2011). Extant research indicates individuals may be sensitive to the probable extent of future
331 transmission when observed by others (Wu et al., 2016b). We therefore expect that cues to a third party's (Person
332 C's) location in shared social networks will be used as a proxy for the potential risk associated with transmission of
333 private information, hence within-network transmission will be viewed as more wrong, more harmful, causing
334 greater discomfort, and a greater violation of privacy than transmission to a socially unconnected third party.

335

336 *H4: Position in an information transfer event will predict judgements of privacy and related reactions.*

337 As noted, the various actors in an information transfer event often have opposing interests in information
338 dissemination. While regulating dissemination is in Person A's interests, second and third parties may benefit from
339 acquiring the given information. If reasoning about privacy is shaped by evolved information-management
340 psychology, the divergent costs and benefits engendered by one's position in an information transfer event should
341 be reflected in privacy perceptions, such that the first party (Person A, who may stand to suffer a cost) will evaluate
342 the situation as more wrong, more harmful, more uncomfortable, and a greater violation of privacy than those in
343 the position of a second or third party (Persons B or C, who may stand to reap a benefit).

344

345 3.2 Study 1 Methods

346 Study 1 consisted of 36 vignettes, each depicting a hypothetical information transfer event between two or
347 three people. The basic structure was as follows:

348


349 *Person A has personal medical information about themselves that Person B learns about.*

350 *(In some vignettes) Person B conveys this information to Person C.*

351

352 Each vignette altered a feature of the information transfer event hypothesized to be relevant to privacy
353 perceptions (for discussion of principles of vignette design, see Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010). Participants were
354 assigned one of nine base vignettes, each composed of a unique combination of the two between-subject variables,
355 *Manner of Acquisition*, i.e., how Person B obtained the information that Person A possessed, and *Position*, i.e.,
356 whether the participant was asked to imagine themselves as Person A, Person B, or another individual not involved
357 in the event (Person D). In addition to one of the nine possible base vignettes, each participant was shown four
358 within-subject *Information Transmission* conditions. These conditions varied the extent to which information was
359 transmitted beyond Person B. Due to the structure of the vignettes, full randomization of Information
360 Transmission was deemed likely to create confusion amongst participants, therefore the order of conditions was
361 randomized, save for the Unknown condition, which was always presented first. See Figure 1 for details on
362 independent variables.

363 Following each vignette, participants were asked to evaluate the scenario along four dimensions:
364 Discomfort, Wrongness, Harmfulness, and Violation of Privacy. Save for Violation of Privacy (measured on an
365 unbalanced 4-point scale) all were measured on a balanced 7-point scale intended to minimize demand effects.
366 Violation of Privacy was measured on an unbalanced 4-point measure because during pretesting the alternative
367 balanced 7-point scale was deemed overly confusing. These measures were chosen to allow for multiple indicators
368 of negative reactions to an information transfer event.
369



370
 371 **Figure 1. Schematic representation of vignette conditions for Study 1.** Participants were assigned one of
 372 nine base vignettes, each composed of a unique combination of the two between-subject variables, *Manner of*
 373 *Acquisition*, i.e., how Person B obtained the information that Person A possessed, and *Position*, i.e., whether the
 374 participant was asked to imagine themselves as Person A, Person B, or another individual not involved in the event
 375 (Person D). In addition to one of the nine possible base vignettes, each participant was shown four within-subject
 376 *Information Transmission* conditions.
 377

378 Studies 1 and 2 were approved by the University of California, Los Angeles IRB. All data and materials
379 used can be accessed at https://osf.io/c9emx/overview?view_only=1a31b5e0d1524526a0dba95584a3687a.

380

381 3.3 Study 1 Participants

382 Participants (n=453; 47.4% female), recruited via the Prolific crowdsourcing platform for a study
383 described as “Privacy Related Perceptions,” were native English-speaking U.S. residents ages 18-70 (mean=36).
384 Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine base vignettes, each constituting a unique combination of the
385 two between-subjects variables. Participants’ responses were removed for incompleteness, survey completion times
386 above 1140 or below 120 seconds, or for failing an attention check, leaving n=425 in the final sample.

387

388 3.4 Study 1 Data Analysis

389 For each dependent measure, the lme4 and lmerTest R packages (Bates et al., 2015; Kuznetsova et al.,
390 2017) were used to fit a three-way linear mixed effects model designed to test the association between Position
391 (three levels), Manner of Acquisition (three levels, ‘Acquisition’ for short), and Information Transmission (four
392 levels, ‘Transmission’ for short) and all interactions. Transmission was a within-subject variable, with each
393 participant shown all four conditions for a given combination of the two between-subject variables, Acquisition
394 and Position. The linear mixed effects model enabled accounting for the lack of independence between repeated
395 observations in Transmission as a random effect associated with participant ID, while also accounting for the fixed
396 effects of Acquisition and Position.

397 To compare differences between Information Transmission conditions as well as differences between
398 Position conditions, we conducted tests of contrasts between estimated marginal means (EMMs) using the linear
399 mixed effects models discussed above. EMMs were obtained using the emmeans R package (Lenth, 2025).

400

401 3.5 Study 1 Results

402 Overall, results of Study 1 demonstrate a highly consistent structure across all four dependent measures in
403 how the three independent variables—Position, Manner of Acquisition, and Information Transmission—affect
404 participant responses (see Figure 2). The largest effects were observed for Transmission and Acquisition, with both
405 factors producing strong main effects and highly significant two-way interactions across models. The effect of
406 Position was, in contrast, weaker and less stable. While Position did show a significant main effect for Discomfort,
407 Wrongness, and Harmfulness, it did not for Violation of Privacy. For interaction effects, Position x Acquisition did
408 not reach significance in any model, whereas Position x Transmission was significant in all four models. These
409 results suggest that, while Position influences how participants respond to different types of information flow, it
410 has limited influence as a main effect.

411 It is possible that the influence of Position as a variable may be strongest in particular combinations of
412 Acquisition and Transmission contexts. Fixed-effect tests from the linear mixed effects models were conducted on

413 each of the four dependent variables to examine this possibility. For each model, Table 1 reports Type III F-tests
 414 with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom and associated p-values for all independent and dependent variables.

415


416 Table 1: Summary of Fixed-Effect Tests from Linear Mixed-Effects Models for Four Dependent Variables

	Position	Transmission	Acquisition	Position x Transmission	Position x Acquisition	Acquisition x Transmission	Position x Acquisition x Transmission
Discomfort	$p=3.40 \times 10^{-4}$ F(2,416)=8.1 4	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(3,1248)=2 68.84	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(2,416)=10 0.57	$p=3.83 \times 10^{-3}$ F(6,1248)=3. 22	$p=.76$ F(4,416)=0.4 6	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(6,1248)=3 1.81	$p=7.89 \times 10^{-4}$ F(12,1248)= 2.82
Wrongness	$p=1.66 \times 10^{-3}$ F(2,416)=6.5 0	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(3,1248)=8 60.09	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(2,416)=29 7.95	$p<2.40 \times 10^{-6}$ F(6,1248)=6. 13	$p=.41$ F(4,416)=0.9 9	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(6,1248)=1 30.07	$p=1.74 \times 10^{-4}$ F(12,1248)= 3.17
Harmfulness	$p=.036$ F(2,416)=3.3 7	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(3,1248)=6 45.14	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(2,416)=10 1.94	$p=9.22 \times 10^{-4}$ F(6,1248)=3. 80	$p=.95$ F(4,416)=0.1 8	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(6,1248)=5 0.80	$p=7.33 \times 10^{-4}$ F(12,1248)= 2.84
Violation of Privacy	$p=.58$ F(2,416)=0.5 7	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(3,1248)=6 75.60	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(2,416)=23 0.86	$p=.004$ F(6,1248)=3. 26	$p=.27$ F(4,416)=1.2 9	$p<2.22 \times 10^{-16}$ F(6,1248)=1 01.21	$p=.034$ F(12,1248)= 1.86

417 *Summary of fixed-effect tests from the linear mixed-effects models examining how Position, Information Transmission, and Manner of*
 418 *Acquisition predict four evaluative judgments (Discomfort, Wrongness, Harmfulness, Violation of Privacy). The table reports Type III*
 419 *F-tests with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom and associated p-values. All models included random intercepts for Participant_ID.*

420

421 The results of fixed-effect tests suggest the effect of Position is generally weaker than the other two
 422 independent variables, and expresses most strongly in the Discomfort and Wrongness dependent measures.
 423 Overall, these results indicate that participants rated situations in which Person B actively sought to obtain
 424 information as significantly different than those in which information was obtained unintentionally. Additionally,
 425 transmission to a third party predicted privacy-related perceptions, as participants rated situations in which
 426 transmission occurred beyond the initial recipient of information as more uncomfortable, wrong, harmful, and a
 427 greater violation of privacy than situations in which transmission either was not mentioned or was explicitly ruled
 428 out. One's position in the information transfer event exerted a relatively smaller effect on privacy-related
 429 judgements, though this effect was still significant across multiple measures, meaning participants who imagined
 430 themselves as the target of acquisition and transmission evaluated the scenario more negatively.



432 **Figure 2. Results of Study 1: Interactions between Manner of Acquisition and Transmission across**
 433 **Position conditions.** On the upper label of the X Axis, Person D/B/A represents the Position variable,
 434 indicating the point of view presented in the vignette. The lower labels on the X axis demarcate the four within-
 435 subjects Information Transmission conditions. Manner of Acquisition is represented by line color/type
 436 (Voluntarily Disclosed = solid blue, Overheard–No Intent = dashed red, Overheard–Intentional = dotted orange).
 437 Bars indicate 95% CI.

438

439 Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons of EMMs with Satterthwaite-adjusted degrees of
 440 freedom confirmed these findings. Large, significant differences were observed due to the main effects of
 441 Acquisition and Transmission. These differences were observed across all levels for all dependent measures (all
 442 p 's<.001, except for the Discomfort rating comparison between the Unknown and Outside Social Network
 443 conditions, which had a smaller estimate of -.263, $p=7.4 \times 10^{-3}$).

444 Pairwise comparisons for the main effect of Position revealed mixed results (see Table 2). Overall,
 445 Discomfort and Wrongness appeared to be more sensitive to variation in Position conditions, though those effects
 446 are limited to the Person D–B contrast, and the Person B–A contrast. Across all dependent variables, the Person
 447 D–A contrast was small and insignificant. See Supplementary Information for full model results.

448

449 Table 2. Study 1 Pairwise Comparisons, Main Effect of Position

Comparison	Discomfort (1-7)	Wrongness (1-7)	Harmfulness (1-7)	Violation of Privacy (1-4)
Person D – Person B	$p=2.47 \times 10^{-2}$.35	$p=1.46 \times 10^{-2}$.26	$p=.054$.29	$p=.92$.07
Person D – Person A	$p=.55$ -.17	$p=1.00$ -.04	$p=1.00$.03	$p=1.00$.02
Person B – Person A	$p=3.00 \times 10^{-4}$ -.52	$p=2.5 \times 10^{-3}$ -.31	$p=.10$ -.26	$p=1.00$ -.05

450

451 To analyze the significant interactions of Position x Transmission and Acquisition x Transmission in the
 452 mixed-effects models, additional Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons of EMMs were conducted.

453 Regarding the Position x Transmission interaction, pairwise comparisons were conducted among Position
 454 levels within each Transmission condition. Across all four models, Position differences emerged only when the
 455 Transmission target was Unknown. Within the Unknown condition, participants who imagined themselves as
 456 Person B produced significantly lower ratings than both Person A (p 's<.01) and Person D (p 's<.01), whereas
 457 Person A and D did not differ (all p 's>.10). In contrast, no Position differences were observed in other
 458 Transmission conditions in any model (all p 's>.10), which may indicate the influence of Position is highly

459 conditional, emerging only when there is no stated target of transmission. This result may also be due to the
460 ordering of conditions, a possibility investigated in Study 2.

461 The linear mixed effects models showed the Transmission x Acquisition interaction was strong across all
462 dependent variables. Simple-effects tests of EMMs confirmed this result. When Acquisition was Disclosed or
463 Overheard Unintentionally, all Transmission levels differed significantly from one another (all p 's < .001), with the
464 lowest ratings observed for Inside Social Network and the highest for Unknown or None, depending on the
465 model. In the Intentional Acquisition condition, the pattern was weaker: only a subset of contrasts reached
466 significance (generally Unknown > None and Outside Social Network > Inside Social Network), and effect sizes
467 were substantially smaller. Generally, the magnitude of the Transmission effect decreased as the intentionality of
468 Acquisition increased. This is possibly due to a ceiling effect, with ratings across all dependent variables for
469 Intentional Acquisition hovering at the maximum.

470

471 **4.0 Study 2**

472 In light of possible demand characteristics introduced by Study 1's within-subjects design, we conducted a
473 partial replication study to test the effect of Information Transmission conditions in a between-subjects design.
474 This enabled full randomization of Transmission conditions. This study held constant Position (set at Person A)
475 and Manner of Acquisition (set at Overheard–Unintentional). To strengthen the results given growing concerns
476 regarding artificial data (Zulkey, 2024), this follow-up study was conducted with more extensive anti-AI safeguards,
477 including additional IP address analysis, Prolific's authenticity check tool (a Qualtrics integration), and
478 reCAPTCHA v3 verification (*reCAPTCHA V3*, n.d.).

479

480 4.1 Study 2 Predictions

481 Predictions for Information Transmission remained the same as in Study 1, namely that the risk incurred
482 via transmission will be reflected in privacy perceptions such that subsequent transmission to a third party (i.e.
483 from Person B to Person C) will be viewed as more wrong, more harmful, causing greater discomfort, and a
484 greater violation of privacy than no transmission. Additionally, we expect cues to Person C's location in shared
485 social networks will be used as a proxy for the potential risk associated with transmission of private information,
486 hence transmission to an individual inside Person A's social network will be viewed as more wrong, more harmful,
487 causing greater discomfort, and a greater violation of privacy than transmission to an individual outside Person A's
488 social network.

489

490 4.2 Study 2 Methods

491 Study 2 consisted of four vignettes, each mirroring the Information Transmission conditions of Study 1.
492 Each vignette read as follows:

493

494 *Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you*
 495 *have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the*
 496 *closed door.*

498 Additional information about Information Transmission was added to the end of the vignette, as outlined
 499 in Table 3. Following each vignette, participants were asked to evaluate the scenario along the same four
 500 dimensions as in Study 1: Discomfort, Wrongness, Harmfulness, and Violation of Privacy. As in Study 1, save for
 501 Violation of Privacy (measured on an unbalanced 4-point scale) all were measured on a balanced 7-point scale
 502 intended to minimize demand effects.

503
 504 Table 3. Between Subjects Conditions for Study 2

Information Transmission Condition	Vignette Text
Unknown	<i>No additional content is provided indicating information transmission or lack thereof.</i>
None	Your coworker does not share the information they learned with anyone.
Socially Connected Individual (Inside Social Network)	Later that night, your coworker tells a mutual colleague of yours what they learned.
Socially Unconnected Individual (Outside Social Network)	On a phone call that night, your coworker tells their personal friend what they learned. Their friend lives overseas, and does not know you, your spouse, or anyone else at your workplace.

505

506

507 4.3 Study 2 Participants

508 A power analysis based on the effect sizes observed in Study 1 $F(3,1248)=268.84, \eta^2 \approx 0.39$, conservatively
 509 adjusted to $f=.4$ for a between-subjects design) indicated 30 participants per group would be sufficient to achieve
 510 80% power at $\alpha=.05$ for detecting the main effect of Transmission. Participants for Study 2 ($n=120$; 49% female)
 511 were native English-speaking U.S. residents ages 18-74 (mean=43.42) recruited via Prolific for a study described as
 512 “Privacy Related Perceptions”. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four Information Transmission
 513 conditions. All participants completed the survey within the time parameters (45 seconds to 15 minutes), and all
 514 passed the reCAPTCHA and other safeguards against artificial responses.

515

516 4.4 Study 2 Results

517 A MANOVA designed to test if Transmission influenced the four dependent measures showed a
 518 statistically significant difference in Discomfort, Wrongness, Harmfulness, and Violation of Privacy based on
 519 Transmission condition, Wilks' $\lambda=.459$, $F(12, 299.26)=8.53$, $p=6.35 \times 10^{-14}$. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed
 520 Transmission accounted for substantial variance in Wrongness ($F(3,116)=33.81$, $p=8.90 \times 10^{-16}$, $\eta^2=.47$),
 521 Harmfulness ($F(3,116)=13.67$, $p=1.07 \times 10^{-7}$, $\eta^2=.26$), and Violation of Privacy ratings ($F(3,116)=27.42$, $p=1.78 \times 10^{-13}$, $\eta^2=.41$), and comparatively moderate variance in Discomfort ratings ($F(3,116)=4.72$, $p=.0038$, $\eta^2=.11$).

523 Tukey HSD post-hoc tests indicated evaluative judgements were consistently higher in conditions with a
 524 stated third-party recipient of transmission (either Outside or Inside Social Network) when compared to
 525 conditions with no recipient (Unknown and None) (See Table 4). The Discomfort rating dependent measure
 526 revealed the least significant variation overall, though ratings were significantly lower in the Unknown and Outside
 527 Social Network conditions compared to the None condition ($p=.39$ and $.002$, respectively). For Wrongness,
 528 Harmfulness, and Violation of Privacy measures, ratings in the Outside and Inside Social Network conditions were
 529 consistently higher than in the Unknown or None conditions (all p 's $<.001$).

530

531 Table 4. Study 2 Results of Tukey HSD Post Hoc Tests, Mean Differences and Significance Levels


Comparison	Discomfort (1-7)	Wrongness (1-7)	Harmfulness (1-7)	Violation of Privacy (1-4)
Unknown - None	$p=.39$ -1.12	$p=.08$ -0.75	$p=.75$ -0.39	$p=.76$ -0.19
Inside SN - Unknown	$p=.85$ -0.33	$p=1.97 \times 10^{-5}$ 1.50	$p=.05$ 1.00	$p=8.28 \times 10^{-6}$ 1.00
Outside SN - Unknown	$p=.80$ 0.37	$p=1.83 \times 10^{-8}$ 1.96	$p=2.87 \times 10^{-5}$ 1.81	$p=9.37 \times 10^{-9}$ 1.29
Inside SN - None	$p=.24$ 0.79	$p=2.97 \times 10^{-10}$ 2.25	$p=2.56 \times 10^{-3}$ 1.39	$p=1.21 \times 10^{-7}$ 1.19
Outside SN - None	$p=2.43 \times 10^{-3}$ 1.49	$p=1.35 \times 10^{-13}$ 2.70	$p=4.03 \times 10^{-7}$ 2.20	$p=8.76 \times 10^{-11}$ 1.47
Outside SN – Inside SN	$p=.32$ 0.70	$p=.44$ 0.46	$p=.14$ 0.81	$p=.48$ 0.27

532 SN = social network

533

534 Tukey post-hoc tests revealed no significant difference between Outside and Inside Social Network
 535 conditions. To specifically test the differences between these two conditions, planned comparisons were conducted
 536 using linear models with custom contrasts. Results produced coefficient estimates in the expected direction,

537 though few reached conventional significance. Harmfulness showed a significant difference at $b=-0.41$, $SE=0.19$,
 538 $t(116)=-2.15$, $p=.03$. Discomfort, Wrongness and Violation of Privacy all failed to reach significance.
 539



540
 541
 542 **Figure 3. Results of Study 2: Evaluative judgements of Discomfort, Wrongness, Harmfulness, and**
 543 **Violation of Privacy across Information Transmission conditions.**

544
 545 It is possible these results are due to a ceiling effect (see Figure 3). As such, and because of the ordinal
 546 nature of the data, we also conducted Wilcoxon rank-sum tests with continuity correction to evaluate the
 547 differences between conditions. Results failed to indicate significant differences for Discomfort ($p=.067$),
 548 Wrongness ($p=.089$), and Violation of Privacy ($p=.054$) ratings, though did for significant differences for
 549 Harmfulness ratings ($p=.039$).

550 Further testing was also done to evaluate differences between the None and Unknown conditions.
 551 Planned comparisons were conducted using linear models with custom contrasts. Results showed a significant
 552 contrast for the Discomfort ($b=0.56$, $SE=0.21$, $t(116)=2.70$, $p=.008$) and Wrongness ($b=.37$, $SE =0.15$,
 553 $t(116)=2.41$, $p=.018$) dependent measures. Harmfulness and Violation of privacy both failed to reach significance.
 554 Wilcoxon rank-sum tests with continuity correction followed this pattern, with significant differences for
 555 Discomfort ($p=3.80 \times 10^{-3}$) and Wrongness ($p=.026$), but not Harmfulness or Violation of Privacy.

556
 557 **5.0 Discussion**

558 In contemporary behavioral literature, privacy is often theorized in terms of the sensitivity of information
559 (Gerber et al., 2018; Schwartz & Solove, 2011). Although this is undoubtedly important to privacy-related
560 psychology, an evolutionary perspective suggests other reliable features of human interaction may be equally
561 important. While reflecting the judgments of a limited online sample of U.S. residents, our findings indicate three
562 distinct features of an information transfer event—the way in which information is acquired, the extent of
563 transmission, and an individual’s position in the event—influence judgements concerning privacy and perceptions
564 of wrongness, harm, and discomfort.

565 As predicted, how information was acquired strongly predicted participants’ evaluative judgements.
566 Vignettes in which the acquirer actively and intentionally obtained information were evaluated as significantly more
567 wrong, harmful, uncomfortable, and a greater violation of privacy than those in which information was
568 unintentionally obtained or disclosed consensually by Person A—consistent with the unwelcome acquisition of
569 information being considered a transgression. These results suggest participants classify violations of privacy as
570 moral violations. Accordingly, judgements of privacy may conform with other observed trends for moral
571 judgement, including patterns in judgements of permissibility, fault, causality, and responsibility (for example, see
572 Leslie et al., 2006).

573 Notably, though the contrasts were smaller, differences persisted even without an intentional
574 transgression: participants consistently rated vignettes where Person B unintentionally overheard information as
575 significantly more uncomfortable, harmful, wrong, and a greater violation of privacy than those in which Person A
576 volunteered information to Person B.

577 Where information went once acquired also had a strong influence on evaluative judgements. Across both
578 studies, participants rated transmission to a third party as significantly more harmful, uncomfortable, wrong, and a
579 greater violation of privacy than conditions in which there was no transmission to a third party. Additionally,
580 unsanctioned transmission predicted privacy judgements even when initial disclosure was voluntary. These results
581 support the proposal that individuals have implicit, unstated assumptions about how, when, and to whom
582 information will be transmitted after the initial point of acquisition. This is exactly what would be expected if
583 privacy judgements are shaped by a psychology that evolved to minimize the costs associated with information
584 dissemination, as each additional person adds risk both of direct negative consequences and of further
585 transmission.

586 We hypothesized that participants would use an individuals’ location in shared social networks as a proxy
587 for the potential costs of information dissemination. While results in a within-subjects design provided strong
588 support for this hypothesis, the between-subjects design provided only marginal support. Study 2 results trended in
589 the predicted direction, though often failed to reach high levels of significance. It is possible that this was due to a
590 ceiling effect, as mean scores for both conditions were clustered around the tail end of the ordinal scale. The most
591 significant difference across the third-party recipient conditions in Study 2 was observed in the harmfulness
592 measure. The stronger results of Study 1 may indicate these differences have more salience when placed in direct
593 comparison. Overall, we interpret these results as demonstrating transmission to a third party who shares social

594 connections with the first party was regarded as more harmful than transmission to a socially unconnected third
595 party, and as suggesting similar patterns for other privacy-related judgements. More research is needed to fully
596 illuminate this effect.

597 The effect of variation in the Position condition is also consistent with a broader understanding of
598 evolved information-management psychology. Participants asked to imagine themselves as Person A evaluated
599 vignettes as more harmful, more uncomfortable, and more wrong than those adopting the perspective of Persons
600 B or C. While the observed effect of variation in Position was weaker than the effects of the other two
601 independent variables (Information Transmission and Manner of Acquisition), this pattern is nevertheless
602 consistent with the diverging interests between the initial possessor of information and those who might benefit
603 from its acquisition and dissemination. It remains to be explored why the effect of variation in Position conditions
604 failed to reach significance for the Violation of Privacy measure.

605 Interestingly, ratings of wrongness and discomfort were higher across both studies when future
606 transmission was unspecified (the Unknown condition) than when it was explicitly ruled out. While not a predicted
607 result, this may signify that, lacking additional information with which to evaluate risk, participants followed an
608 error-management strategy, inferring some risk of further transmission.

609

610 5.1 Limitations and Future Work

611 The present study has notable limitations, and, as such, should be considered preliminary. First, we
612 utilized hypothetical situations requiring participants to adopt another’s perspective, hence responses may differ
613 from behavior in analogous real-world situations. Minor variations exist between vignette conditions in Study 1,
614 such as the implication that the focal individual has a spouse in some conditions. Additionally, due to the nature of
615 the manipulations, some vignettes are longer than others. Though these variations were produced for logical
616 cohesion, they may constitute minor confounds. Although we believe it is unlikely this affected the core results of
617 the study, further work is needed to entirely rule out this possibility.

618 Our vignettes employed medical information in an effort to enhance plausibility and avoid implications of
619 moral wrongdoing. While we think it unlikely that employing an equally ecologically valid and morally neutral type
620 of information would produce substantially different results, we cannot rule out this possibility. More generally, it
621 is unsurprising that medical information is considered private in our study population, as this category of
622 information would have held adaptive significance throughout much of human history. In many environments,
623 information about an individual’s health, including physical injury or illness, has substantial importance in a variety
624 of fitness-relevant social domains, including the selection of mates (Stephen & Luoto, 2023), models from whom
625 to learn (Henrich & Broesch, 2011), and cooperative partners (Krupp et al., 2011). Therefore, while the present
626 study does not test how the valence or details of this information affects privacy judgements, this type of
627 information, more broadly, is likely to be a salient locus of individuals’ efforts to regulate information acquisition
628 and transmission in many cultures.

629 More broadly, while the predictions addressed in the current study derive from a consideration of
630 postulated panhuman psychological mechanisms, cultural evolution is certainly a key force shaping concepts of
631 privacy. Because all humans are members of a culture-dependent species, any given participant's judgments
632 regarding privacy necessarily reflect the combined effects of biologically evolved psychological mechanisms and
633 culturally evolved ideas. Our sample and vignettes are specific to an English-speaking, North American cultural
634 context, hence we are unable to differentiate the relative contributions of these two factors to participants'
635 judgments from these studies alone. Future work must therefore be conducted across disparate cultures to best
636 understand notions of privacy as the product of these two forces. Such cross-cultural research will afford testing
637 hypotheses regarding a variety of functional configurations potentially produced by cultural evolution; below we
638 consider some possibilities.

639 *5.1.1 Interdependence, Group size, and Mobility*

640 Extrapolating from the core logic of our model, we suggest a number of ways in which cultures may
641 systematically vary. First, the more that, in multiple domains, the individual's welfare is tied to that of the group,
642 the lower the conflict between the interests of information-holders and the interests of would-be information-
643 acquirers within the group. We can therefore expect concepts of privacy and related norms to be more socially
644 expansive in cultures in which people are highly dependent on one another, i.e., individuals will be more willing to
645 share personal information with group members, and group members will feel more entitled to acquire and
646 disseminate such information within the group.

647 Largely separate from issues of interdependence, the intersection of group size and both physical and
648 social mobility may shape the degree of conflict between the interests of information holders and the interests of
649 would-be information acquirers. In small groups with low physical and social mobility, the actions of one
650 individual can impact a large percentage of those around them, and this can occur even when cooperation levels
651 are relatively low. This increases third parties' stake in acquiring information about a given individual, as such
652 information can inform interventions to preclude or punish disruptive behavior. This likely results in contests and
653 conflicts between the individual who seeks to avoid prying eyes and their neighbors who, both figuratively and
654 literally, peer over the fence.

655 Interdependence, group size, and mobility are some of the more prominent factors likely to play a role in
656 the cultural evolution of privacy concepts, norms, and practices. However, neither this list, nor our conjectures
657 concerning it, are exhaustive, as we expect that a functionalist evolutionary approach to privacy will prove a
658 productive source of testable hypotheses concerning similarities and differences in privacy across cultures.

659 *5.1.1 Digital Privacy*

660 We end this paper where we began, namely with the matter of privacy-related judgements and behaviors
661 in the digital age. While we did not explicitly test predictions about digital privacy, we believe the present work
662 provides an invaluable foundation upon which to understand issues of privacy online. In seeking to explain
663 behaviors and sentiments online, an evolutionary approach asks scholars to first consider how people think, feel,
664 and behave outside of such a radically novel environment. If perceptions of privacy are indeed shaped by evolved

665 aspects of socio-informational cognition, then notions of digital privacy should reflect similar dynamics to those
666 evident in in-person situations, including those demonstrated in this study. Fundamental to this proposal is the
667 argument that regardless of whether a user is interacting on- or off-line, consistent in both settings is the human
668 mind—a mind that does not change in its core structure when switching between these two environments.

669 Importantly, while the mind does not change across the digital/analog divide, the cues and signals that it
670 has evolved to detect in in-person situations do not map cleanly onto digital environments. In this sense, what
671 Acquisti *et al.* (2022) refer to as the “privacy gap,” or the dichotomy between contemporary digital situations and
672 those in the physical world, can be understood as an evolutionary mismatch between novel online environments
673 and their analog counterparts, a conceptualization that Shariff *et al.* (2021) similarly explored. Both sets of authors
674 highlight how the cues that would have historically alerted someone to an increased likelihood of information
675 acquisition—specifically, cues of the physical presence of others—are starkly limited, if not entirely absent, in
676 digital environments. We concur, but add that the scope of a privacy evolutionary mismatch likely extends well
677 beyond the ability to accurately gauge the likelihood of information acquisition occurring.

678 Our results suggest people may have implicit assumptions regarding how information spreads in social
679 environments, assumptions that may be out of step with digital technology. These discrepancies are the locus of
680 many possible hypotheses regarding privacy perceptions. For example, we postulate that evaluations regarding *to*
681 *whom* information is likely to spread depend on assumptions regarding the size and structure of social networks and
682 the likelihood of communication within and between those social networks. The environments created by modern
683 communication technology present many opportunities for these expectations to be violated. Rather than flow
684 through organic social networks, social media algorithms disregard expected paths of transmission by artificially
685 biasing what content is shown to which users. Likewise, the speed of transmission is not constrained by the rate of
686 contact within social networks, and the audience size has few upward boundaries. Furthermore, rather than
687 indexed in the minds of discrete individuals, information in the digital environment is highly searchable, including
688 visual information and facial identification.

689 Features of individual agents within social networks are additional sites of contrast between digital and
690 analog information environments. Assessments of *what* information is likely to spread depend on assumptions
691 regarding what information others are likely to pay attention to, remember, recall, and transmit. In-person
692 interactions are characterized by the reliably fallible memories and limited attention of participants, who may only
693 transmit information if it has some relevance to their life or the lives of those whom they know. In contrast,
694 written information communicated between individuals via online messaging platforms, or the visual information
695 acquired via photo sharing or security cameras, may exist indefinitely in its entirety. Hence, if concepts of privacy
696 center around the expected extent of information dissemination, the key to understanding the misalignment of
697 digital privacy attitudes and online behaviors may lie in a better understanding of the ways in which the
698 information environment created by digital technology radically diverges from evolutionarily longstanding
699 regularities in the speed, accuracy, and direction in which information can travel. These are but a few of the ways in

700 which a fuller understanding of biologically and culturally evolved information-management systems can illuminate
701 the privacy challenges posed by the rapidly changing information environments of the 21st century.
702
703

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707

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712

713 **Author Contributions**

714 SK Conceived, designed, and ran the study; conducted analyses, and composed the primary draft of the
715 manuscript. DF assisted in formulation of hypotheses and study design, and contributed to the writing of the
716 manuscript.

717

718 **Conflicts of Interest**

719 Authors declare none.

720

721 **Research Transparency and Reproducibility and Data Availability**

722 The data associated with this research are available at

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724 **References**

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An Evolutionary Approach to Privacy and Information Management Psychology Supplementary Information

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All materials for the manuscript “An Evolutionary Approach to Privacy and Information Management Psychology,” including data, R code, and pre-registrations not provided here, may be found at https://osf.io/c9emx/overview?view_only=1a31b5e0d1524526a0dba95584a3687a

A. Study 1: Linear Mixed Effects Model Results

1. Discomfort: Mixed effects model with Position, Transmission, and Acquisition as fixed effects and Participant ID as a random effect.
 - a. **Table S1.** Scaled residuals
 - b. **Table S2.** Random effects
 - c. **Table S3.** Fixed effects
 - d. **Table S4.** Anova results
2. Wrongness: Mixed effects model with Position, Transmission, and Acquisition as fixed effects and Participant ID as a random effect.
 - a. **Table S5.** Scaled residuals
 - b. **Table S6.** Random effects
 - c. **Table S7.** Fixed effects
 - d. **Table S8.** Anova results
3. Harmfulness: Mixed effects model with Position, Transmission, and Acquisition as fixed effects and Participant ID as a random effect.
 - a. **Table S9.** Scaled residuals
 - b. **Table S10.** Random effects
 - c. **Table S11.** Fixed effects
 - d. **Table S12.** Anova results
4. Violation of Privacy: Mixed effects model with Position, Transmission, and Acquisition as fixed effects and Participant ID as a random effect.
 - a. **Table S13.** Scaled residuals
 - b. **Table S14.** Random effects
 - c. **Table S15.** Fixed effects
 - d. **Table S16.** Anova results
5. **Figure S1.** Plot of Between Subjects Effects (Position and Manner of Acquisition)
6. Pairwise Contrasts for Position x Information Transmission Interaction
 - a. **Table S17.** Discomfort
 - b. **Table S18.** Wrongness
 - c. **Table S19.** Harmfulness
 - d. **Table S20.** Violation of Privacy
7. Pairwise Contrasts for Information Transmission x Manner of Acquisition
 - a. **Table S21.** Discomfort
 - b. **Table S22.** Wrongness
 - c. **Table S23.** Harmfulness
 - d. **Table S24.** Violation of Privacy
8. Pairwise contrasts for Main Independent Variables: Manner of Acquisition
 - a. **Table S25.** Discomfort
 - b. **Table S26.** Wrongness
 - c. **Table S27.** Harmfulness

- d. **Table S28.** Violation of Privacy
 9. Pairwise contrasts for Main Independent Variables: Information Transmission
 - a. **Table S29.** Discomfort
 - b. **Table S30.** Wrongness
 - c. **Table S31.** Harmfulness
 - d. **Table S32.** Violation of Privacy
 10. Pairwise contrasts for Main Independent Variables: Position
 - a. **Table S33.** Discomfort
 - b. **Table S34.** Wrongness
 - c. **Table S35.** Harmfulness
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B. Study 1: Demographic Information

1. **Table S37.** Study 1 Vignette distribution
2. **Table S38.** Study 1 Demographic Information
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C. Study 2 ANOVA Results and Post Hoc Tests

1. **Table 40.** MANOVA Test
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D. Study 2: Planned Contrasts between Inside Social Network and Outside Social Network

1. **Table 51.** LM Discomfort Residuals
2. **Table 52.** LM Discomfort Coefficients
3. **Table 53.** LM Wrongness Residuals
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5. **Table 55.** LM Harmfulness Residuals
6. **Table 56.** LM Wrongness Coefficients
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8. **Table 58.** LM Violation of Privacy Coefficients

E. Study 2: Planned Contrasts between Unknown and None

9. **Table 59.** LM Discomfort Residuals
10. **Table 60.** LM Discomfort Coefficients
11. **Table 61.** LM Wrongness Residuals
12. **Table 62.** LM Wrongness Coefficients
13. **Table 63.** LM Harmfulness Residuals
14. **Table 64.** LM Wrongness Coefficients
15. **Table 65.** LM Violation of Privacy Residuals
16. **Table 66.** LM Violation of Privacy Coefficients

F. Study 2 Demographic Information

4. **Table S67.** Study 2 Vignette distribution
5. **Table S68.** Study 2 Demographic Information
6. **Table S69.** Study 2 Demographic Information (cont.)

G. Vignette Setup for Study 1 and Study 2

H. Survey Materials for Study 1 and Study 2

1. Discomfort: Mixed effects model with Position, Transmission, and Acquisition as fixed effects and Participant ID as a random effect.

$$Discomfort \sim Position * Transmission * Acquisition + (1 | Participant_ID)$$

For Discomfort, the linear mixed effects model conducted revealed significant main effects of Position, Manner of Acquisition, and Information Transmission (all ps < 0.001). In terms of interactions, Position x Transmission was significant (p<0.001), as was Transmission x Acquisition (p<0.001), and Position x Acquisition x Transmission (p<0.001). In contrast, Position x Acquisition failed to reach significance.

Table S1. Scaled Residuals

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-3.8591	-0.4582	0.0915	0.5401	3.1275

Table S2. Random Effects

Groups	Name	Variance	Std. Dev
Participant ID	(Intercept)	0.875	0.9354
Residual		1.397	1.1818

Number of observations: 1700

Groups: Participant_ID, 425

Table S3. Fixed Effects

Predictor	Estimate	SE	df	t	p
(Intercept)	3.83	0.22	1,151.48	17.62	< .001
Person1B	-0.53	0.31	1,151.48	-1.7	0.089
Person1A	0.29	0.31	1,151.48	0.95	0.341
InfoTrans1None	-1.23	0.24	1,248.00	-5.1	< .001
InfoTrans1OutsideSN	0.58	0.24	1,248.00	2.42	0.016
InfoTrans1InsideSN	1.92	0.24	1,248.00	7.95	< .001
MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	1.4	0.31	1,151.48	4.54	< .001
MannerAcq1OverheardIn	2.08	0.31	1,151.48	6.77	< .001
Person1B:InfoTrans1None	0.64	0.34	1,248.00	1.86	0.063
Person1A:InfoTrans1None	-0.77	0.34	1,248.00	-2.25	0.025
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN	0.13	0.34	1,248.00	0.39	0.698
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN	0.44	0.34	1,248.00	1.28	0.202
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN	0.45	0.34	1,248.00	1.31	0.189
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN	0.25	0.34	1,248.00	0.74	0.46
Person1B:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.23	0.44	1,151.48	0.53	0.597
Person1A:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.42	0.44	1,151.48	-0.95	0.34
Person1B:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.24	0.44	1,151.48	0.55	0.581

Person1A:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.03	0.43	1,151.48	0.07	0.947
InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.79	0.34	1,248.00	-2.32	0.02
InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.73	0.34	1,248.00	-2.14	0.033
InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.77	0.34	1,248.00	-2.26	0.024
InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	1.19	0.34	1,248.00	3.48	<.001
InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.21	0.34	1,248.00	-0.61	0.542
InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.15	0.34	1,248.00	-3.36	<.001
Person1B:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.2	0.49	1,248.00	0.41	0.681
Person1A:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	1.47	0.49	1,248.00	3.04	0.002
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.34	0.49	1,248.00	-0.7	0.482
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.03	0.49	1,248.00	0.06	0.956
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.84	0.49	1,248.00	-1.72	0.085
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.25	0.49	1,248.00	-0.52	0.606
Person1B:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.1	0.49	1,248.00	-2.26	0.024
Person1A:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.41	0.48	1,248.00	0.86	0.392
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.64	0.49	1,248.00	-1.31	0.19
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.83	0.48	1,248.00	-1.73	0.084
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.72	0.49	1,248.00	-1.48	0.138
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.48	0.48	1,248.00	-1.01	0.314

Table S4. Anova Results

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Sum Sq</i>	<i>Mean Sq</i>	<i>NumDF</i>	<i>DenDF</i>	<i>F value</i>	<i>Pr(>F)</i>
Person 1	22.74215	11.371073	2	416	8.1421297	3.399171e-04
Ans1	1126.37398	375.457995	3	1248	268.8425098	1.423749e-134
Acq1	280.90024	140.450120	2	416	100.5677423	2.356487e-36
Person1:InfoTrans1	26.98569	4.497616	6	1248	3.2204676	3.830420e-03
Person1:MannerAcq1	2.59686	0.649215	4	416	0.4648631	7.615323e-01
Ans1:MannerAcq1	266.53418	44.422364	6	1248	31.8081384	9.600555e-36
Person1:InfoTrans1:Ma	47.32643	3.943869	12	1248	2.8239632	7.884897e-04

nnerAcq1

2. Wrongness: Mixed effects model with Position, Transmission, and Acquisition as fixed effects and Participant ID as a random effect.

$$\text{Wrong} \sim \text{Position} * \text{Transmission} * \text{Acquisition} + (1 | \text{Participant_ID})$$

For Wrongness, the linear mixed effects model conducted revealed highly significant main effects of Acquisition ($p < 0.001$), and Transmission ($p < 0.001$), and a slightly less significant main effect of Position ($p < 0.01$). In terms of interactions, Position x Transmission was highly significant ($p < 0.000$), as was Transmission x Acquisition ($p < 0.001$), and Position x Acquisition x Transmission ($p < 0.001$). In contrast, Position x Acquisition also failed to reach significance.

Table S5. Scaled Residuals

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-3.7861	-0.4850	0.0521	0.5048	4.0096

Table S6. Random Effects

Groups	Name	Variance	Std. Dev
Participant ID	(Intercept)	0.3488	0.5906
Residual		0.9971	0.9985

Number of observations: 1700 Groups: Participant_ID, 425

Table S7. Fixed Effects

Predictor	Estimate	SE	df	t	p
(Intercept)	4.21	0.17	1,384.96	25.13	< .001
Person1B	-1.43	0.24	1,384.96	-5.96	< .001
Person1A	-0.57	0.24	1,384.96	-2.39	0.017
InfoTrans1None	-2.21	0.20	1,248.00	-10.83	< .001
InfoTrans1OutsideSN	0.92	0.20	1,248.00	4.50	< .001
InfoTrans1InsideSN	1.96	0.20	1,248.00	9.61	< .001
MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.27	0.24	1,384.96	1.14	0.253
MannerAcq1OverheardIn	2.52	0.24	1,384.96	10.65	< .001
Person1B:InfoTrans1None	0.93	0.29	1,248.00	3.18	0.002
Person1A:InfoTrans1None	0.00	0.29	1,248.00	-0.02	0.988
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN	1.84	0.29	1,248.00	6.33	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN	0.87	0.29	1,248.00	3.00	0.003
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN	1.76	0.29	1,248.00	6.04	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN	1.00	0.29	1,248.00	3.45	< .001
Person1B:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.70	0.34	1,384.96	2.07	0.039

Person1A:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.88	0.34	1,384.96	2.61	0.009
Person1B:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	1.11	0.34	1,384.96	3.28	0.001
Person1A:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.38	0.33	1,384.96	1.14	0.255
InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.06	0.29	1,248.00	0.22	0.828
InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.27	0.29	1,248.00	0.94	0.348
InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.15	0.29	1,248.00	0.51	0.613
InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	1.35	0.29	1,248.00	4.70	< .001
InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.17	0.29	1,248.00	-4.05	< .001
InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.94	0.29	1,248.00	-6.72	< .001
Person1B:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.38	0.41	1,248.00	-0.92	0.358
Person1A:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.13	0.41	1,248.00	0.31	0.753
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-1.32	0.41	1,248.00	-3.20	0.001
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.93	0.41	1,248.00	-2.27	0.023
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-1.04	0.41	1,248.00	-2.52	0.012
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-1.25	0.41	1,248.00	-3.06	0.002
Person1B:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.83	0.41	1,248.00	-2.02	0.044
Person1A:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.30	0.41	1,248.00	0.73	0.463
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.86	0.41	1,248.00	-4.50	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.66	0.41	1,248.00	-1.62	0.105
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.43	0.41	1,248.00	-3.48	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.78	0.41	1,248.00	-1.92	0.055

Table S8. Anova Results

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Sum Sq</i>	<i>Mean Sq</i>	<i>NumDF</i>	<i>DenDF</i>	<i>F value</i>	<i>Pr(>F)</i>
Person 1	12.965309	6.4826547	2	416	6.5017354	1.657926e-03
Ans1	2572.711023	857.5703409	3	1248	860.0944670	4.056601e-303
Acq1	594.144306	297.0721531	2	416	297.9465392	5.051394e-81
Person1:InfoTrans1	36.675095	6.1125158	6	1248	6.1305070	2.400114e-06
Person1:MannerAcq1	3.978233	0.9945583	4	416	0.9974856	4.086573e-01

Ans1:MannerAcq1	778.166250	129.6943749	6	1248	130.0761104	6.768558e-128
Person1:InfoTrans1:MannerAcq1	37.983243	3.1652702	12	1248	3.1745867	1.735163e-04

3. Harmfulness: Mixed effects model with Position, Transmission, and Acquisition as fixed effects and Participant ID as a random effect.

$$\text{Harmfulness} \sim \text{Position} * \text{Transmission} * \text{Acquisition} + (1 | \text{Participant_ID})$$

For Harmfulness, the linear mixed effects model conducted revealed highly significant main effects of Acquisition ($p < 0.001$), and Transmission ($p < 0.001$), and only moderately significant effects of Position ($p = 0.035$). In terms of interactions, Position x Transmission was highly significant ($p < 0.001$), as was Transmission x Acquisition ($p < 0.001$), and Position x Acquisition x Transmission ($p < 0.001$). In contrast, Position x Acquisition again failed to reach significance.

Table S9. Scaled Residuals

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-3.5952	-0.5475	0.0571	0.5833	3.5002

Table S10. Random Effects

Groups	Name	Variance	Std. Dev
Participant ID	(Intercept)	0.7067	0.8407
Residual		1.3169	1.1476

Number of observations: 1700

Groups: Participant_ID, 425

Table S11. Fixed Effects

Predictor	Estimate	SE	df	t	p
(Intercept)	3.56	0.21	1,218.26	17.35	< .001
Person1B	-1.35	0.29	1,218.26	-4.58	< .001
Person1A	-0.46	0.29	1,218.26	-1.56	0.118
InfoTrans1None	-1.63	0.23	1,248.00	-6.94	< .001
InfoTrans1OutsideSN	0.52	0.23	1,248.00	2.22	0.026
InfoTrans1InsideSN	2.27	0.23	1,248.00	9.69	< .001
MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.27	0.29	1,218.26	0.93	0.351
MannerAcq1OverheardIn	1.85	0.29	1,218.26	6.39	< .001
Person1B:InfoTrans1None	0.78	0.33	1,248.00	2.32	0.020
Person1A:InfoTrans1None	-0.01	0.33	1,248.00	-0.04	0.968
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN	1.76	0.33	1,248.00	5.26	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN	0.67	0.33	1,248.00	2.01	0.044
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN	1.84	0.33	1,248.00	5.49	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN	0.73	0.33	1,248.00	2.19	0.029
Person1B:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.87	0.42	1,218.26	2.08	0.037
Person1A:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.62	0.41	1,218.26	1.51	0.132

Person1B:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	1.06	0.42	1,218.26	2.55	0.011
Person1A:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.50	0.41	1,218.26	1.22	0.223
InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.02	0.33	1,248.00	0.06	0.950
InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.46	0.33	1,248.00	1.38	0.167
InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.31	0.33	1,248.00	0.94	0.346
InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	1.02	0.33	1,248.00	3.08	0.002
InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.42	0.33	1,248.00	-1.26	0.209
InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.23	0.33	1,248.00	-3.71	< .001
Person1B:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.35	0.47	1,248.00	-0.74	0.460
Person1A:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.17	0.47	1,248.00	0.36	0.717
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-1.67	0.47	1,248.00	-3.53	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.71	0.47	1,248.00	-1.52	0.130
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-1.51	0.47	1,248.00	-3.18	0.002
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-1.18	0.47	1,248.00	-2.52	0.012
Person1B:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.98	0.47	1,248.00	-2.06	0.039
Person1A:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.14	0.47	1,248.00	0.29	0.769
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-2.00	0.47	1,248.00	-4.22	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.03	0.47	1,248.00	-2.21	0.027
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.64	0.47	1,248.00	-3.46	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.91	0.47	1,248.00	-1.95	0.052

Table S12. Anova Results

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Sum Sq</i>	<i>Mean Sq</i>	<i>NumDF</i>	<i>DenDF</i>	<i>F value</i>	<i>Pr(>F)</i>
Person 1	8.8708977	4.4354488	2	416	3.3681473	3.539559e-02
Ans1	2548.6977265	849.5659088	3	1248	645.1349579	3.765669e-253
Acq1	268.5029396	134.2514698	2	416	101.9465534	9.322168e-37
Person1:InfoTrans1	30.0536617	5.0089436	6	1248	3.8036421	9.218691e-04
Person1:MannerAcq1	0.9406512	0.2351628	4	416	0.1785756	9.494159e-01
Ans1:MannerAcq1	401.4045054	66.9007509	6	1248	50.8024306	4.594271e-56

Person1:InfoTrans1:Ma annerAcq1	44.8987330	3.7415611	12	1248	2.8412297	7.327749e-04
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4. Violation of Privacy: Mixed effects model with Position, Transmission, and Acquisition as fixed effects and Participant ID as a random effect.

$$Violation \sim Position * Transmission * Acquisition + (1 | Participant_ID)$$

For Violation of Privacy, the linear mixed effects model conducted revealed highly significant main effects of Acquisition ($p < 0.001$), and Transmission ($p < 0.001$), while Position failed to reach significance. In terms of interactions, Position x Transmission was significant ($p < 0.01$), while Transmission x Acquisition was highly significant ($p < 0.001$). Position x Acquisition x Transmission was only moderately significant for this dependent variable ($p = 0.034$). Position x Acquisition again failed to reach significance.

Table S13. Scaled Residuals

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-3.0382	-0.5558	0.0263	0.5766	4.2302

Table S14. Random Effects

Groups	Name	Variance	Std. Dev
Participant ID	(Intercept)	0.1963	0.4431
Residual		0.3620	0.6017

Number of observations: 1700 Groups: Participant_ID, 425

Table S15. Fixed Effects

Predictor	Estimate	SE	df	t	p
(Intercept)	1.92	0.11	1,213.82	17.77	< .001
Person1B	-0.68	0.15	1,213.82	-4.39	< .001
Person1A	-0.26	0.15	1,213.82	-1.68	0.094
InfoTrans1None	-0.69	0.12	1,248.00	-5.60	< .001
InfoTrans1OutsideSN	1.02	0.12	1,248.00	8.31	< .001
InfoTrans1InsideSN	1.69	0.12	1,248.00	13.74	< .001
MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.17	0.15	1,213.82	1.09	0.275
MannerAcq1OverheardIn	1.92	0.15	1,213.82	12.57	< .001
Person1B:InfoTrans1None	0.47	0.18	1,248.00	2.68	0.008
Person1A:InfoTrans1None	0.18	0.17	1,248.00	1.01	0.311
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN	0.67	0.18	1,248.00	3.84	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN	0.00	0.17	1,248.00	0.00	0.998
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN	0.86	0.18	1,248.00	4.88	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN	0.38	0.17	1,248.00	2.16	0.031
Person1B:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.86	0.22	1,213.82	3.94	< .001
Person1A:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.56	0.22	1,213.82	2.57	0.010

Person1B:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.37	0.22	1,213.82	1.68	0.094
Person1A:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.12	0.22	1,213.82	0.58	0.565
InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	0.21	0.17	1,248.00	1.20	0.231
InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.04	0.17	1,248.00	-0.24	0.810
InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.08	0.17	1,248.00	-0.48	0.631
InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	0.27	0.17	1,248.00	1.56	0.119
InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.06	0.17	1,248.00	-6.12	< .001
InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-1.69	0.17	1,248.00	-9.72	< .001
Person1B:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.55	0.25	1,248.00	-2.19	0.028
Person1A:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.31	0.25	1,248.00	-1.27	0.203
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.77	0.25	1,248.00	-3.07	0.002
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.19	0.25	1,248.00	-0.78	0.436
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.93	0.25	1,248.00	-3.72	< .001
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardUnIn	-0.68	0.25	1,248.00	-2.76	0.006
Person1B:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.29	0.25	1,248.00	-1.18	0.239
Person1A:InfoTrans1None:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.16	0.25	1,248.00	-0.65	0.513
Person1B:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.57	0.25	1,248.00	-2.29	0.022
Person1A:InfoTrans1OutsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.02	0.25	1,248.00	-0.08	0.939
Person1B:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.46	0.25	1,248.00	-1.87	0.062
Person1A:InfoTrans1InsideSN:MannerAcq1OverheardIn	-0.16	0.25	1,248.00	-0.64	0.524


Table S16. Anova Results

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Sum Sq</i>	<i>Mean Sq</i>	<i>NumDF</i>	<i>DenDF</i>	<i>F value</i>	<i>Pr(>F)</i>
Person 1	0.398319	0.1991595	2	416	0.5501266	5.772958e-01
Ans1	733.747953	244.5826511	3	1248	675.5963737	8.125167e-261
Acq1	167.155449	83.5777243	2	416	230.8618668	3.572578e-68
Person1:InfoTrans1	7.073734	1.1789556	6	1248	3.2565602	3.511538e-03
Person1:MannerAcq1	1.881278	0.4703194	4	416	1.2991359	2.696387e-01
Ans1:MannerAcq1	219.842662	36.6404436	6	1248	101.2097577	7.546560e-104

Person1:InfoTrans1:Man nerAcq1	8.108190	0.6756825	12	1248	1.8663983	3.442731e-02
-----------------------------------	----------	-----------	----	------	-----------	--------------

5. Figure S1. Plot of Between Subjects Effects (Position and Manner of Acquisition)

Visual assessment of this plot does not show a strong effect of Position on DV ratings.



6. Pairwise Contrasts for Position x Information Transmission Interaction

Table S17. Discomfort

emm_PI_m1 <- emmeans(m1, ~ Person1 | InfoTrans1)
pairs(emm_PI_m1, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Transmission Condition</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
D - B	Unknown	0.37	0.18	1,151.48	2.06	0.119
D - A	Unknown	-0.16	0.18	1,151.48	-0.93	1
B - A	Unknown	-0.54	0.18	1,151.48	-2.98	0.009
D - B	None	0.03	0.18	1,151.48	0.16	1
D - A	None	-0.02	0.18	1,151.48	-0.13	1
B - A	None	-0.05	0.18	1,151.48	-0.28	1
D - B	OutsideSN	0.56	0.18	1,151.48	3.14	0.005
D - A	OutsideSN	-0.33	0.18	1,151.48	-1.88	0.18
B - A	OutsideSN	-0.90	0.18	1,151.48	-4.99	< .001
D - B	InsideSN	0.44	0.18	1,151.48	2.44	0.044
D - A	InsideSN	-0.17	0.18	1,151.48	-0.98	0.986
B - A	InsideSN	-0.61	0.18	1,151.48	-3.41	0.002

Table S18. Wrongness

emm_PI_m2 <- emmeans(m2, ~ Person1 | InfoTrans1)
pairs(emm_PI_m2, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Transmission Condition</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
D - B	Unknown	0.82	0.14	1384.956	5.94	< .001
D - A	Unknown	0.15	0.14	1384.956	1.10	0.815
B - A	Unknown	-0.67	0.14	1384.956	-4.85	< .001
D - B	None	0.30	0.14	1384.956	2.17	0.091
D - A	None	0.01	0.14	1384.956	0.09	1.000
B - A	None	-0.29	0.14	1384.956	-2.08	0.113
D - B	OutsideSN	0.04	0.14	1384.956	0.26	1.000
D - A	OutsideSN	-0.19	0.14	1384.956	-1.39	0.496
B - A	OutsideSN	-0.23	0.14	1384.956	-1.63	0.309
D - B	InsideSN	-0.11	0.14	1384.956	-0.82	1.000
D - A	InsideSN	-0.17	0.14	1384.956	-1.25	0.631
B - A	InsideSN	-0.06	0.14	1384.956	-0.42	1.000

Table S19. Harmfulness

```
emm_PI_m3 <- emmeans(m3, ~ Person1 | InfoTrans1)
pairs(emm_PI_m3, adjust = "bonferroni")
```

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Transmission Condition</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
D - B	Unknown	0.70	0.17	1218.257	4.14	< .001
D - A	Unknown	0.08	0.17	1218.257	0.49	1.000
B - A	Unknown	-0.62	0.17	1218.257	-3.66	< .001
D - B	None	0.37	0.17	1218.257	2.17	0.090
D - A	None	-0.01	0.17	1218.257	-0.04	1.000
B - A	None	-0.38	0.17	1218.257	-2.21	0.081
D - B	OutsideSN	0.16	0.17	1218.257	0.97	0.996
D - A	OutsideSN	-0.01	0.17	1218.257	-0.03	1.000
B - A	OutsideSN	-0.17	0.17	1218.257	-1.00	0.946
D - B	InsideSN	-0.08	0.17	1218.257	-0.50	1.000
D - A	InsideSN	0.05	0.17	1218.257	0.31	1.000
B - A	InsideSN	0.14	0.17	1218.257	0.80	1.000

Table S20. Violation of Privacy

```
emm_PI_m4 <- emmeans(m4, ~ Person1 | InfoTrans1)
pairs(emm_PI_m4, adjust = "bonferroni")
```

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Transmission Condition</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
D - B	Unknown	0.27	0.09	1213.82	3.01	0.008
D - A	Unknown	0.03	0.09	1213.82	0.34	1.000
B - A	Unknown	-0.24	0.09	1213.82	-2.67	0.023
D - B	None	0.08	0.09	1213.82	0.88	1.000
D - A	None	0.01	0.09	1213.82	0.13	1.000
B - A	None	-0.07	0.09	1213.82	-0.75	1.000
D - B	OutsideSN	0.04	0.09	1213.82	0.43	1.000
D - A	OutsideSN	0.10	0.09	1213.82	1.14	0.767
B - A	OutsideSN	0.06	0.09	1213.82	0.70	1.000
D - B	InsideSN	-0.12	0.09	1213.82	-1.39	0.499
D - A	InsideSN	-0.07	0.09	1213.82	-0.75	1.000
B - A	InsideSN	0.06	0.09	1213.82	0.64	1.000

7. Pairwise Contrasts for Information Transmission x Manner of Acquisition

Table S21. Discomfort

emm_IM_m1 <- emmeans(m1, ~ InfoTrans1 | MannerAcq1)
pairs(emm_IM_m1, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Transmission Condition</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Unknown - None	Disclosed	1.27	0.14	1248	9.04	< .001
Unknown - OutsideSN	Disclosed	-0.77	0.14	1248	-5.50	< .001
Unknown - InsideSN	Disclosed	-2.15	0.14	1248	-15.29	< .001
None - OutsideSN	Disclosed	-2.05	0.14	1248	-14.53	< .001
None - InsideSN	Disclosed	-3.42	0.14	1248	-24.33	< .001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	Disclosed	-1.38	0.14	1248	-9.79	< .001
Unknown - None	OverheardUnIn	1.51	0.14	1248	10.66	< .001
Unknown - OutsideSN	OverheardUnIn	0.06	0.14	1248	0.43	1.000
Unknown - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-1.02	0.14	1248	-7.20	< .001
None - OutsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-1.45	0.14	1248	-10.23	< .001
None - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-2.52	0.14	1248	-17.85	< .001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-1.08	0.14	1248	-7.63	< .001

Table S22. Wrongness

emm_IM_m2 <- emmeans(m2, ~ InfoTrans1 | MannerAcq1)
pairs(emm_IM_m2, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Transmission Condition</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Unknown - None	Disclosed	1.90	0.12	1248	15.98	< .001
Unknown - OutsideSN	Disclosed	-1.82	0.12	1248	-15.32	< .001
Unknown - InsideSN	Disclosed	-2.88	0.12	1248	-24.19	< .001
None - OutsideSN	Disclosed	-3.72	0.12	1248	-31.30	< .001
None - InsideSN	Disclosed	-4.78	0.12	1248	-40.18	< .001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	Disclosed	-1.06	0.12	1248	-8.88	< .001
Unknown - None	OverheardUnIn	1.92	0.12	1248	16.10	< .001
Unknown - OutsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-1.34	0.12	1248	-11.24	< .001
Unknown - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-2.26	0.12	1248	-18.92	< .001
None - OutsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-3.26	0.12	1248	-27.34	< .001
None - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-4.18	0.12	1248	-35.02	< .001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-0.92	0.12	1248	-7.68	< .001

Table S23. Harmfulness

emm_IM_m3 <- emmeans(m3, ~ InfoTrans1 | MannerAcq1)
pairs(emm_IM_m3, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Transmission Condition</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Unknown - None	Disclosed	1.37	0.14	1248	10.03	< .001
Unknown - OutsideSN	Disclosed	-1.33	0.14	1248	-9.74	< .001
Unknown - InsideSN	Disclosed	-3.13	0.14	1248	-22.87	< .001
None - OutsideSN	Disclosed	-2.70	0.14	1248	-19.77	< .001
None - InsideSN	Disclosed	-4.50	0.14	1248	-32.90	< .001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	Disclosed	-1.79	0.14	1248	-13.13	< .001
Unknown - None	OverheardUnIn	1.41	0.14	1248	10.27	< .001
Unknown - OutsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-0.99	0.14	1248	-7.24	< .001
Unknown - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-2.54	0.14	1248	-18.52	< .001
None - OutsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-2.40	0.14	1248	-17.52	< .001
None - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-3.95	0.14	1248	-28.79	< .001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-1.55	0.14	1248	-11.27	< .001

Table S24. Violation of Privacy

emm_IM_m4 <- emmeans(m4, ~ InfoTrans1 | MannerAcq1)
pairs(emm_IM_m4, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Transmission Condition</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Unknown - None	Disclosed	0.47	0.07	1248	6.58	< .001
Unknown - OutsideSN	Disclosed	-1.25	0.07	1248	-17.38	< .001
Unknown - InsideSN	Disclosed	-2.10	0.07	1248	-29.28	< .001
None - OutsideSN	Disclosed	-1.72	0.07	1248	-23.97	< .001
None - InsideSN	Disclosed	-2.57	0.07	1248	-35.86	< .001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	Disclosed	-0.85	0.07	1248	-11.89	< .001
Unknown - None	OverheardUnIn	0.55	0.07	1248	7.65	< .001
Unknown - OutsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-0.89	0.07	1248	-12.30	< .001
Unknown - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-1.48	0.07	1248	-20.55	< .001
None - OutsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-1.44	0.07	1248	-19.96	< .001
None - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-2.03	0.07	1248	-28.20	< .001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	OverheardUnIn	-0.59	0.07	1248	-8.25	< .001

8. Pairwise contrasts for Main Independent Variables: Manner of Acquisition

Table S25. Discomfort

```
emm_manner_m1 <- emmeans(m1, ~ MannerAcq1)
pairs(emm_manner_m1, adjust = "bonferroni")
```

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Disclosed - Overheard Unintentional	-0.784	0.132	416	-5.934	<.0001
Disclosed - Overheard Intentional	-1.852	0.131	416	-14.120	<.0001
Overheard Unintentional - Overheard Intentional	-1.068	0.131	416	-8.129	<.0001

Table S26. Wrongness

```
emm_manner_m2 <- emmeans(m2, ~ MannerAcq1)
pairs(emm_manner_m2, adjust = "bonferroni")
```

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Disclosed - Overheard Unintentional	-0.518	0.0923	416	-5.610	<.0001
Disclosed - Overheard Intentional	-2.142	0.0917	416	-23.367	<.0001
Overheard Unintentional - Overheard Intentional	-1.624	0.0918	416	-17.684	<.0001

Table S27. Harmfulness

```
emm_manner_m3 <- emmeans(m3, ~ MannerAcq1)
pairs(emm_manner_m3, adjust = "bonferroni")
```

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Disclosed - Overheard Unintentional	-0.527	0.121	416	-4.338	0.0001
Disclosed - Overheard Intentional	-1.682	0.121	416	-13.945	<.0001
Overheard Unintentional - Overheard Intentional	-1.155	0.121	416	-9.55	<.0001

Table S28. Violation of Privacy

```
emm_manner_m4 <- emmeans(m4, ~ MannerAcq1)
pairs(emm_manner_m4, adjust = "bonferroni")
```

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
-----------------	-----------------	-----------	-----------	----------	----------

Disclosed - Overheard Unintentional	-0.374	0.0639	416	-5.857	<.0001
Disclosed - Overheard Intentional	-1.322	0.0635	416	-20.823	<.0001
Overheard Unintentional - Overheard Intentional	-0.947	0.0636	416	-14.897	<.0001

9. Pairwise contrasts for Main Independent Variables: Information Transmission

Table S29. Discomfort

emm_info_m1 <- emmeans(m1, ~ InfoTrans1)
pairs(emm_info_m1, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Unknown - None	1.031	0.0811	1248	12.707	<.0001
Unknown - OutsideSN	-0.263	0.0811	1248	-3.239	0.0074
Unknown - InsideSN	-1.258	0.0811	1248	-15.505	<.0001
None - OutsideSN	-1.293	0.0811	1248	-15.946	<.0001
None - InsideSN	-2.288	0.0811	1248	-28.212	<.0001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	-0.995	0.0811	1248	-12.266	<.0001

Table S30. Wrongness

emm_info_m2 <- emmeans(m2, ~ InfoTrans1)
pairs(emm_info_m2, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Unknown - None	1.516	0.0685	1248	22.125	<.0001
Unknown - OutsideSN	-0.993	0.0685	1248	-14.495	<.0001
Unknown - InsideSN	-1.780	0.0685	1248	-25.973	<.0001
None - OutsideSN	-2.510	0.0685	1248	-36.621	<.0001
None - InsideSN	-3.296	0.0685	1248	-48.099	<.0001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	-0.787	0.0685	1248	-11.478	<.0001

Table S31. Harmfulness

emm_info_m3 <- emmeans(m3, ~ InfoTrans1)
pairs(emm_info_m3, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Unknown - None	1.136	0.0788	1248	14.431	<.0001
Unknown - OutsideSN	-0.743	0.0788	1248	-9.439	<.0001
Unknown - InsideSN	-2.238	0.0788	1248	-28.418	<.0001
None - OutsideSN	-1.880	0.0788	1248	-23.870	<.0001
None - InsideSN	-3.375	0.0788	1248	-42.848	<.0001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	-1.495	0.0788	1248	-18.978	<.0001

Table S32. Violation of Privacy

emm_info_m4 <- emmeans(m4, ~ InfoTrans1)

pairs(emm_info_m4, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Unknown - None	0.458	0.0413	1248	11.094	<.0001
Unknown - OutsideSN	-0.706	0.0413	1248	-17.104	<.0001
Unknown - InsideSN	-1.260	0.0413	1248	-30.518	<.0001
None - OutsideSN	-1.164	0.0413	1248	-28.199	<.0001
None - InsideSN	-1.718	0.0413	1248	-41.612	<.0001
OutsideSN - InsideSN	-0.554	0.0413	1248	-13.413	<.0001

10. Pairwise contrasts for Main Independent Variables: Position

Table S33. Discomfort

emm_person_m1 <- emmeans(m1, ~ Person1)
pairs(emm_person_m1, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Person D - Person B	0.351	0.132	416	2.655	0.0247
Person D - Person A	-0.174	0.130	416	-1.333	0.5500
Person B - Person A	-0.524	0.132	416	-3.970	0.0003

Table S34. Wrongness

emm_person_m2 <- emmeans(m2, ~ Person1)
pairs(emm_person_m2, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Person D - Person B	0.2613	0.0923	416	2.831	0.0146
Person D - Person A	-0.0496	0.0923	416	-0.545	1.0000
Person B - Person A	-0.3110	0.0923	416	-3.368	0.0025

Table S35. Harmfulness

emm_person_m3 <- emmeans(m3, ~ Person1)
pairs(emm_person_m3, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Person D - Person B	0.2879	0.121	416	2.370	0.0547
Person D - Person A	0.0301	0.120	416	0.251	1.0000
Person B - Person A	-0.2579	0.121	416	-2.122	0.1032

Table S36. Violation of Privacy

emm_person_m4 <- emmeans(m4, ~ Person1)
pairs(emm_person_m4, adjust = "bonferroni")

<i>Contrast (Position Condition)</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Person D - Person B	0.0653	0.0639	416	1.022	0.9218
Person D - Person A	0.0189	0.0631	416	0.300	1.0000
Person B - Person A	-0.0464	0.0639	416	-0.726	1.0000

Study 1: Demographic Information

450 participants were recruited via the Prolific crowdsourcing platform for participation in this study. Participants were native English-speaking U.S. residents ages 18-70. Data were screened for completeness, completion times between 120 and 1140 seconds, and correct response to an attention check, leaving n = 425 in the final sample. Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine base vignettes, each constituting a unique combination of the two between-subjects variables (Position and Manner of Acquisition).

Table S37. Study 1 Vignette distribution

Vignette	Position	Manner of Acquisition	N	%
No. 1	Person A	Overheard - Intentional	47	11.06
No. 2	Person A	Overheard - Unintentional	47	11.06
No. 3	Person A	Disclosed	50	11.76
No. 4	Person B	Overheard - Intentional	46	10.82
No. 5	Person B	Overheard - Unintentional	45	10.59
No. 6	Person B	Disclosed	46	10.82
No. 7	Person D	Overheard - Intentional	48	11.29
No. 8	Person D	Overheard - Unintentional	48	11.29
No. 9	Person D	Disclosed	48	11.29

Table S38. Study 1 Demographic Data

		N	%
Gender	Male	210	48.0
	Female	204	49.0
	Other	11	2.6
Level of Education	Advanced degree	72	16.9
	Bachelor's degree	165	38.8
	Associate's degree or technical school	52	12.2
	Some college	86	20.2
	High school	50	11.8
Level of Religiosity/Spirituality	Very religious/spiritual	60	14.1
	Somewhat religious/spiritual	99	23.3
	A little religious/spiritual	113	26.6
	Not at all religious/spiritual	153	36.0
Political orientation	Very conservative	22	5.2
	Somewhat conservative	40	9.4
	A little conservative	45	10.6

Neither liberal nor conservative	82	19.3
A little liberal	84	19.8
Somewhat liberal	100	23.5
Very liberal	84	19.8

Table S39. Study 1 Demographic Data (cont.)

	Mean	Median	Std. Deviation
Age	36.16	34.00	12.15
Duration (seconds)	262.69	224.00	141.49

C. Study 2 ANOVA Results and Post Hoc Tests

A MANOVA was conducted to test if Information Transmission influenced the four dependent measures. This test showed a statistically significant difference in Discomfort, Wrongness, Harmfulness, and Violation based on Transmission condition, Wilks' $\lambda = .459$, $F(12, 299.26) = 8.53$, $p < .001$. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed Transmission accounted for substantial variance in Wrongness ($F(3,116) = 33.81$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .47$), Harmfulness ($F(3,116) = 13.67$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .26$), and Violation of Privacy ratings ($F(3,116) = 27.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .41$), and comparatively moderate variance in Discomfort ratings ($F(3,116) = 4.72$, $p = .0038$, $\eta^2 = .11$).

Table 40. MANOVA Test

```
fit_manova <- manova(cbind(Discomfort, Wrong, Harm, Violate) ~ InfoTrans, data = d)
summary(fit_manova, test = "Wilks")
```

	Df	Wilks	F	Num Df	Den Df	Pr(>F)
InfoTrans	3	0.45929	0.45929	12	299.26	<.0001
Residuals	116					

Table 41. ANOVA Test Discomfort

```
aov_discomfort <- aov(Discomfort ~ InfoTrans, data = d)
summary(aov_discomfort)
```

	Df	Sum Sq	Mean Sq	F value	Pr(>F)
InfoTrans	3	35.91	11.971	4.723	0.0038
Residuals	116	294.01	2.535		

Table 42. Tukey HSD Discomfort

```
TukeyHSD(aov_discomfort)
```

Contrast	Diff	lwr	upr	P adj
2-1	-1.1195402	-2.2002380	-0.03884245	0.0392655
3-1	-0.3333333	-1.4048335	0.73816685	0.8492028
4-1	0.3698925	-0.6929315	1.43271640	0.8010407
3-2	0.7862069	-0.2944909	1.86690468	0.2352873
4-2	1.4894327	0.4173367	2.56152867	0.0024311
4-3	0.7032258	-0.3595981	1.76604974	0.3156299

Table 43. ANOVA Test Wrongness

```
aov_wrong <- aov(Wrong ~ InfoTrans, data = d)
summary(aov_wrong)
```

	Df	Sum Sq	Mean Sq	F value	Pr(>F)
--	----	--------	---------	---------	--------

InfoTrans	3	143.4	47.81	33.81	8.9e-16
Residuals	116	164.0	1.41		

Table 44. Tukey HSD Wrongness

TukeyHSD(aov_wrong)

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Diff</i>	<i>lwr</i>	<i>upr</i>	<i>P adj</i>
2-1	-0.745977	-1.5531953	0.06124131	0.0810142
3-1	1.500000	0.6996517	2.30034825	0.0000197
4-1	1.955914	1.1620464	2.74978157	0.0000000
3-2	2.245977	1.4387587	3.05319533	0.0000000
4-2	2.701891	1.9010977	3.50268425	0.0000000
4-3	0.455914	-0.3379536	1.24978157	0.4426168

Table 45. ANOVA Test Harmfulness

aov_harm <- aov(Harm ~ InfoTrans, data = d)

summary(aov_harm)

	<i>Df</i>	<i>Sum Sq</i>	<i>Mean Sq</i>	<i>F value</i>	<i>Pr(>F)</i>
InfoTrans	3	89.48	29.827	13.67	1.07e-07
Residuals	116	253.11	2.182		

Table 46. Tukey HSD Harmfulness

TukeyHSD(aov_harm)

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Diff</i>	<i>lwr</i>	<i>upr</i>	<i>P adj</i>
2-1	-0.3873563	-1.390069346	0.6153567	0.7456575
3-1	1.0000000	0.005820859	1.9941791	0.0480968
4-1	1.8139785	0.827849520	2.8001075	0.0000287
3-2	1.3873563	0.384643298	2.3900693	0.0025558
4-2	2.2013348	1.206602893	3.1960667	0.0000004
4-3	0.8139785	-0.172150480	1.8001075	0.1431960

Table 47. ANOVA Test Violation of Privacy

aov_violate <- aov(Violate ~ InfoTrans, data = d)

summary(aov_violate)

	<i>Df</i>	<i>Sum Sq</i>	<i>Mean Sq</i>	<i>F value</i>	<i>Pr(>F)</i>
InfoTrans	3	47.63	15.877	27.42	1.78e-13
Residuals	116	67.17	0.579		

Table 50. Tukey HSD Violation of Privacy*TukeyHSD(aov_violate)*

<i>Contrast</i>	<i>Diff</i>	<i>lwr</i>	<i>upr</i>	<i>P adj</i>
2-1	-0.1942529	-0.7107928	0.3222871	0.7609467
3-1	1.0000000	0.4878562	1.5121438	0.0000083
4-1	1.2784946	0.7704978	1.7864914	0.0000000
3-2	1.1942529	0.6777129	1.7107928	0.0000001
4-2	1.4727475	0.9603189	1.9851761	0.0000000
4-3	0.2784946	-0.2295022	0.7864914	0.4839413

D. Study 2: Planned Contrasts between Inside Social Network and Outside Social Network

Table 51. LM Discomfort Residuals

```
contrast_matrix <- rbind("3_vs_4" = c(0, 0, 1, -1))
contrasts(d$InfoTrans) <- t(contrast_matrix)
fit <- lm(Discomfort ~ InfoTrans, d)
summary(fit)
```

<i>Min</i>	<i>1Q</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>3Q</i>	<i>Max</i>
-4.9032	-0.5333	0.5862	1.0968	1.8000

Table 52. LM Discomfort Coefficients

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t value</i>	<i>Pr(> t)</i>
(Intercept)	5.2626	0.1454	36.201	< 2e-16
InfoTrans3_vs_4	-0.3516	0.2039	-1.725	0.08724
InfoTrans	0.8628	0.2926	2.949	0.00386
InfoTrans	-0.4652	0.2913	-1.597	0.11302

Residual standard error: 1.592 on 116 degrees of freedom
 Multiple R-squared: 0.1089, Adjusted R-squared: 0.08581
 F-statistic: 4.723 on 3 and 116 DF, p-value: 0.003801

Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

```
d34 <- subset(d, InfoTrans %in% c(3,4))
contrast_matrix <- rbind("3_vs_4" = c(0, 0, 1, -1))
t(contrast_matrix)
wilcox.test(Discomfort ~ InfoTrans, data = d34)
```

data: Discomfort by InfoTrans
 W = 343.5, p-value = 0.06744
 alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0

Table 53. LM Wrongness Residuals

```
fit <- lm(Wrong ~ InfoTrans, d)
summary(fit)
```

<i>Min</i>	<i>1Q</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>3Q</i>	<i>Max</i>
-3.3667	-0.3667	0.3793	0.6774	3.3793

Table 54. LM Wrongness Coefficients

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t value</i>	<i>Pr(> t)</i>
--	-----------------	-------------------	----------------	--------------------

(Intercept)	5.0442	0.1086	46.454	< 2e-16
InfoTrans3_vs_4	-0.2280	0.1523	-1.497	0.1371
InfoTrans	2.1232	0.2185	9.716	< 2e-16
InfoTrans	0.4294	0.2176	1.973	0.0508

Residual standard error: 1.189 on 116 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.4665, Adjusted R-squared: 0.4527
F-statistic: 33.81 on 3 and 116 DF, p-value: 8.904e-16

Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

t(contrast_matrix)
wilcox.test(Wrong ~ InfoTrans, data = d34)

data: Wrong by InfoTrans
W = 354.5, p-value = 0.08908
alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0

Table 55. LM Harmfulness Residuals

fit <- lm(Harm ~ InfoTrans, d)
summary(fit)

<i>Min</i>	<i>1Q</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>3Q</i>	<i>Max</i>
-3.7667	-0.7667	0.2333	1.2333	3.6207

Table 56. LM Harmfulness Coefficients

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t value</i>	<i>Pr(> t)</i>
(Intercept)	4.3733	0.1349	32.423	< 2e-16
InfoTrans3_vs_4	-0.4070	0.1892	-2.152	0.0335
InfoTrans	1.5624	0.2715	5.756	7.17e-08
InfoTrans	0.4427	0.2703	1.638	0.1042

Residual standard error: 1.477 on 116 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.2612, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2421
F-statistic: 13.67 on 3 and 116 DF, p-value: 1.072e-07

Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

t(contrast_matrix)
wilcox.test(Harm ~ InfoTrans, data = d34)

data: Harm by InfoTrans
W = 326.5, p-value = 0.03968
alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0

Table 57. LM Violation of Privacy Residuals

fit <- lm(Violate ~ InfoTrans, d)
summary(fit)

<i>Min</i>	<i>1Q</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>3Q</i>	<i>Max</i>
-1.6452	-0.3667	-0.1724	0.6333	1.8276

Table 58. LM Violation of Privacy Coefficients

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t value</i>	<i>Pr(> t)</i>
(Intercept)	2.8877	0.0695	41.560	< 2e-16
InfoTrans3_vs_4	-0.1392	0.0974	-1.429	0.15568
InfoTrans	1.1749	0.1398	8.402	1.26e-13
InfoTrans	0.4089	0.1393	2.936	0.00401

Residual standard error: 0.7609 on 116 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.4149, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3998
F-statistic: 27.42 on 3 and 116 DF, p-value: 1.778e-13

Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

t(contrast_matrix)
wilcox.test(Violate ~ InfoTrans, data = d34)

data: Violate by InfoTrans
W = 349, p-value = 0.05442
alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0

E. Study 2: Planned Contrasts between Unknown and None

Table 59. LM Discomfort Residuals

```
contrast_matrix <- rbind("1_vs_2" = c(1, -1, 0, 0))
contrasts(d$InfoTrans) <- t(contrast_matrix)
fit <- lm(Discomfort ~ InfoTrans, d)
summary(fit)
```

<i>Min</i>	<i>1Q</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>3Q</i>	<i>Max</i>
-4.9032	-0.5333	0.5862	1.0968	1.8000

Table 60. LM Discomfort Coefficients

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t value</i>	<i>Pr(> t)</i>
(Intercept)	5.2626	0.1454	36.201	< 2e-16
InfoTrans1_vs_2	0.5598	0.2073	2.700	0.00796
InfoTrans	0.0571	0.2912	0.196	0.84480
InfoTrans	0.7604	0.2879	2.641	0.00939

Residual standard error: 1.592 on 116 degrees of freedom
 Multiple R-squared: 0.1089, Adjusted R-squared: 0.08581
 F-statistic: 4.723 on 3 and 116 DF, p-value: 0.003801

Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

```
d12 <- subset(d, InfoTrans %in% c(1,2))
contrast_matrix <- rbind("1_vs_2" = c(1, -1, 0, 0))
t(contrast_matrix)
wilcox.test(Discomfort ~ InfoTrans, data = d12)
```

data: Discomfort by InfoTrans
 W = 671.5, p-value = 0.0001935
 alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0

Table 61. LM Wrongness Residuals

```
fit <- lm(Wrong ~ InfoTrans, d)
summary(fit)
```

<i>Min</i>	<i>1Q</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>3Q</i>	<i>Max</i>
-3.667	-0.2667	0.3793	0.6774	3.3793

Table 62. LM Wrongness Coefficients

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t value</i>	<i>Pr(> t)</i>
(Intercept)	5.0442	0.1086	46.454	< 2e-16
InfoTrans1_vs_2	0.3730	0.1548	2.409	0.0176

InfoTrans	1.2576	0.2175	5.782	6.35e-08
InfoTrans	1.7135	0.2150	7.969	1.23e-12

Residual standard error: 1.189 on 116 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.4665, Adjusted R-squared: 0.4527
F-statistic: 33.81 on 3 and 116 DF, p-value: 8.904e-16

Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

t(contrast_matrix)
wilcox.test(Wrong ~ InfoTrans, data = d12)

data: Wrong by InfoTrans
W = 572, p-value = 0.02553
alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0

Table 63. LM Harmfulness Residuals

fit <- lm(Harm ~ InfoTrans, d)
summary(fit)

<i>Min</i>	<i>1Q</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>3Q</i>	<i>Max</i>
-3.7667	-0.7667	0.2333	1.2333	3.6207

Table 64. LM Harmfulness Coefficients

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t value</i>	<i>Pr(> t)</i>
(Intercept)	4.3733	0.1349	32.423	< 2e-16
InfoTrans1_vs_2	0.1937	0.1923	1.007	0.31604
InfoTrans	0.7249	0.2702	2.683	0.00837
InfoTrans	1.5388	0.2671	5.761	6.98e-08

Residual standard error: 1.477 on 116 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.2612, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2421
F-statistic: 13.67 on 3 and 116 DF, p-value: 1.072e-07

Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

t(contrast_matrix)
wilcox.test(Harm ~ InfoTrans, data = d12)

data: Harm by InfoTrans
W = 511.5, p-value = 0.2381
alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0

Table 65. LM Violation of Privacy Residuals

fit <- lm(Violate ~ InfoTrans, d)
summary(fit)

<i>Min</i>	<i>1Q</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>3Q</i>	<i>Max</i>
-1.6452	-0.3667	-0.1724	0.6333	1.8276

Table 66. LM Violation of Privacy Coefficients

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t value</i>	<i>Pr(> t)</i>
(Intercept)	2.8877	0.0695	41.560	< 2e-16
InfoTrans1_vs_2	0.0971	0.0991	0.980	0.329
InfoTrans	0.7350	0.1392	5.281	6.08e-07
InfoTrans	1.0135	0.1376	7.366	2.78e-11

Residual standard error: 0.7609 on 116 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.4149, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3998
F-statistic: 27.42 on 3 and 116 DF, p-value: 1.778e-13

Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction

t(contrast_matrix)

wilcox.test(Violate ~ InfoTrans, data = d12)

data: Violate by InfoTrans

W = 485, p-value = 0.4128

alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0

F. Study 2 Demographic Information

A power analysis based on the effect sizes observed in Study #1 $F(3,1248)=268.84$, $\eta^2 \approx 0.39$, conservatively adjusted to $f = 0.4$ for a between-subjects design) indicated that 30 participants per group would be sufficient to achieve 80% power at $\alpha = .05$ for detecting the main effect of Transmission. Participants for Study #2 ($n = 120$; 49% female) were also native English-speaking U.S. residents ages 18-74 (mean = 43.42) recruited via Prolific for a study described as “Privacy Related Perceptions”. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four Information Transmission conditions. All participants completed the survey within the time parameters (45 seconds to 15 minutes), and all passed the reCAPTCHA and other safeguards against artificial responses.

Table S67. Study 2 Vignette distribution

<i>Unknown</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>Outside Social Network</i>	<i>Inside Social Network</i>
30	29	30	31

Table S68. Study 2 Demographic Data

		N	%
Gender	Male	60	50.0
	Female	59	49.2
	Other	1	0.8
Level of Education	Advanced degree	21	17.5
	Bachelor’s degree	49	40.8
	Associate’s degree or technical school	10	8.3
	Some college	22	18.3
	High school	18	15.0
Level of Religiosity/Spirituality	Very religious/spiritual	27	14.1
	Somewhat religious/spiritual	35	23.3
	A little religious/spiritual	18	26.6
	Not at all religious/spiritual	40	36.0
Political orientation	Very conservative	13	10.8
	Somewhat conservative	20	16.7
	A little conservative	14	11.7

Neither liberal nor conservative	19	15.8
A little liberal	24	20.0
Somewhat liberal	11	9.2
Very liberal	19	15.8

Table S69. Study 2 Demographic Data (cont.)

	Mean	Median	Std. Deviation
Age	43.42	40.50	12.60
Duration (seconds)	147.27	147.30	114.83

G. Vignette Setup for Study 1 and Study 2

Survey 1 Vignette Setup

Position: Person A (Person A POV)

	Manner of Acquisition 1 - Disclosed	Manner of Acquisition 2 - Overheard, Unintentional	Manner of Acquisition 3 - Overheard, Intentional
Information Transmission 1 - Unknown	Imagine you work in an office. You tell a coworker about a personal medical issue you are currently experiencing.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While walking by your office, your coworker overhears your conversation through the closed door. They stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to your conversation.
Information Transmission 2 - None	Imagine you work in an office. You tell a coworker about a personal medical issue you are currently experiencing. Your coworker does not share the information they learned with anyone.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door. Your coworker does not share the information they learned with anyone.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While walking by your office, your coworker overhears your conversation through the closed door. They stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to your conversation. Your coworker does not share the information they learned with anyone.
Information Transmission 3 - Outside Social Network	Imagine you work in an office. You tell a coworker about a personal medical issue you are currently experiencing. On a phone call that night, your coworker tells their personal friend what they learned. Their friend lives overseas, and does not know you, your spouse, or anyone else at your workplace.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door. On a phone call that night, your coworker tells their personal friend what they learned. Their friend lives overseas, and does not know	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While walking by your office, your coworker overhears your conversation through the closed door. They stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to your conversation. On a phone call that night, your coworker tells their personal friend what they

		you, your spouse, or anyone else at your workplace.	learned. Their friend lives overseas, and does not know you, your spouse, or anyone else at your workplace.
Information Transmission 4 - Inside Social Network	Imagine you work in an office. You tell a coworker about a personal medical issue you are currently experiencing. Later that night, your coworker tells a mutual colleague of yours what they learned.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door. Later that night, your coworker tells a mutual colleague of yours what they learned.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While walking by your office, your coworker overhears your conversation through the closed door. They stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to your conversation. Later that night, your coworker tells a mutual colleague of yours what they learned.
DV Discomfort	On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?		
DV Wrong	On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?		
DV Harm	On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?		
DV Violate	On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?		

Position: Person B (Person B POV)

	Manner of Acquisition 1 - Disclosed	Manner of Acquisition 2 - Overheard, Unintentional	Manner of Acquisition 3 - Overheard, Intentional
Information Transmission 1 - Unknown	Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells you about a personal medical issue he has.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert’s office, you happen to overhear his conversation through the closed door.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert’s office, you overhear his conversation through the closed door. You stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to his conversation.
Information Transmission 2 - None	Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells you about a personal medical issue	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the

	<p>he has. You do not share the information you learned with anyone.</p>	<p>phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert's office, you happen to overhear his conversation through the closed door. You do not share the information you learned with anyone.</p>	<p>phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert's office, you overhear his conversation through the closed door. You stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to his conversation. You do not share the information you learned with anyone.</p>
<p>Information Transmission 3 - Outside Social Network</p>	<p>Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells you about a personal medical issue he has. On a phone call that night, you tell your personal friend what you learned. Your friend lives overseas, and does not know Robert, his spouse, or anyone else at your workplace.</p>	<p>Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert's office, you happen to overhear his conversation through the closed door. On a phone call that night, you tell your personal friend what you learned. Your friend lives overseas, and does not know Robert, his spouse, or anyone else at your workplace.</p>	<p>Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert's office, you overhear his conversation through the closed door. You stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to his conversation. On a phone call that night, you tell your personal friend what you learned. Your friend lives overseas, and does not know Robert, his spouse, or anyone else at your workplace.</p>
<p>Information Transmission 4 - Inside Social Network</p>	<p>Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells you about a personal medical issue he has. Later that night, you tell a mutual colleague what you learned.</p>	<p>Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert's office, you happen to overhear his conversation through the closed door. Later that night, you tell a mutual colleague what you learned.</p>	<p>Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert's office, you overhear his conversation through the closed door. You stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to his conversation. Later that night, you tell a mutual colleague what you learned.</p>
<p>DV Discomfort</p>	<p>On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being "very comfortable" and 7 being "very uncomfortable," how would you feel in the above scenario?</p>		

DV Wrong	On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?
DV Harm	On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?
DV Violate	On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert's privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert's privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

Position: Person D (Person D POV)

	Manner of Acquisition 1 - Disclosed	Manner of Acquisition 2 - Overheard, Unintentional	Manner of Acquisition 3 - Overheard, Intentional
Information Transmission 1 - Unknown	Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells another coworker, David, about a personal medical issue Robert has.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert's office, another coworker, David, happens to overhear Robert's conversation through the closed door.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert's office, another coworker, David, overhears his conversation through the closed door. David stops walking and gets closer to the door in order to listen to Robert's conversation.
Information Transmission 2 - None	Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells another coworker, David, about a personal medical issue Robert has. David does not share the information he learned with anyone	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert's office, another coworker, David, happens to overhear Robert's conversation through the closed door. David does not share the information he learned with anyone.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert's office, another coworker, David, overhears his conversation through the closed door. David stops walking and gets closer to the door in order to listen to Robert's conversation. David does not share the information he learned with anyone.
Information Transmission 3 - Outside Social Network	Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells another coworker, David, about a personal medical issue Robert has. On a phone call that night, David tells a personal friend what he learned. David's friend	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert's office, another coworker, David, happens to	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert's office, another coworker, David, overhears his conversation

	lives overseas, and does not know Robert, his spouse, or anyone else at David's workplace.	overhear Robert's conversation through the closed door. On a phone call that night, David tells a personal friend what he learned. David's friend lives overseas, and does not know Robert, his spouse, or anyone else at David's workplace.	through the closed door. David stops walking and gets closer to the door in order to listen to Robert's conversation. On a phone call that night, David tells a personal friend what he learned. David's friend lives overseas, and does not know Robert, his spouse, or anyone else at David's workplace.
Information Transmission 4 - Inside Social Network	Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells you about a personal medical issue he is currently experiencing. Later that night, David tells a mutual colleague what he learned.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert's office, another coworker, David, happens to overhear Robert's conversation through the closed door. Later that night, David tells a mutual colleague what he learned.	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert's office, another coworker, David, overhears his conversation through the closed door. David stops walking and gets closer to the door in order to listen to Robert's conversation. Later that night, David tells a mutual colleague what he learned.
DV Discomfort	On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being "very comfortable" and 7 being "very uncomfortable," how would you feel with the events described in the above scenario?		
DV Wrong	On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being "very right" and 7 being "very wrong," how would you describe David's actions in the above scenario?		
DV Harm	On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being "very harmless" and 7 being "very harmful," how would you describe David's actions in the above scenario?		
DV Violate	On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being "did not violate Robert's privacy at all" and 4 being "violated Robert's privacy a lot," how would you describe the above scenario?		

Survey 2 Vignette Setup

Information Transmission Condition	Vignette Text
Unknown	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door.
None	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door. Your coworker does not share the information they learned with anyone.
Socially Connected Individual (Inside Social Network)	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door. On a phone call that night, your coworker tells their personal friend what they learned. Their friend lives overseas, and does not know you, your spouse, or anyone else at your workplace.
Socially Unconnected Individual (Outside Social Network)	Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door. Later that night, your coworker tells a mutual colleague of yours what they learned.

H. Survey Materials for Study 1 and Study 2

Survey Material for Study 1

Start of Block: information sheet

Q1.1

[Research Information Sheet]

Q1.2 Do you consent to participate in this study?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

End of Block: information sheet

Start of Block: Prolific ID

Q2.1 What is your Prolific ID?

Please note that this response should auto-fill with the correct ID

End of Block: Prolific ID

Start of Block: Introduction

Q3.1 In the following survey, you will be asked to read four scenarios. After each one, you will be asked to respond to a set of questions related to the scenario. While each scenario may appear very similar, there are important differences in each one.

End of Block: Introduction

Start of Block: Person A, A1, I1

Q4.1 Please read the following scenario:

Imagine you work in an office. You tell a coworker about a personal medical issue you are currently experiencing.

Q4.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q4.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker's actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q4.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker's actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q4.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Page Break

Q4.6 You will now be shown three alternate versions of the above scenario. Each one will have a different piece of information at the end, in bold.

Page Break

End of Block: Person A, A1, I1
Start of Block: Person A, A1, I2

Q5.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. You tell a coworker about a personal medical issue you are currently experiencing.
Your coworker does not share the information they learned with anyone.

Q5.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q5.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q5.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q5.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

.(1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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Q6.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
.(1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person A, A1, I3

Start of Block: Person A, A1, I4

Q7.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

*Imagine you work in an office. You tell a coworker about a personal medical issue you are currently experiencing.
Later that night, your coworker tells a mutual colleague of yours what they learned.*

Q7.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfor table 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortabl e 2 (2)	A little comfortabl e 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortabl e 4 (4)	A little uncomfortabl e 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortabl e 6 (6)	Very uncomfortabl e 7 (7)
.(1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q7.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker's actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
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. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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Q8.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q8.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q8.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Page Break

Q8.6 You will now be shown three alternate versions of the above scenario. Each one will have a different piece of information at the end, in bold.

Page Break

End of Block: Person A, A2, I1

Start of Block: Person A, A2, I2

Q9.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door.

Your coworker does not share the information they learned with anyone.

Q9.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q9.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q9.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q9.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

Q11.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker's actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q11.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker's actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q11.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person A, A2, I4

Start of Block: Person A, A3, I1

Q12.1 Please read the following scenario:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While walking by your office, your coworker overhears your conversation through the closed door. They stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to your conversation.

Q12.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q12.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q12.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q12.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q12.6 You will now be shown three alternate versions of the above scenario. Each one will have a different piece of information at the end, in bold.

Page Break

End of Block: Person A, A3, I1

Start of Block: Person A, A3, I2

Q13.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While walking by your office, your coworker overhears your conversation through the closed door. They stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to your conversation.

Your coworker does not share the information they learned with anyone.

Q13.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
.(1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q13.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
.(1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q13.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

Q14.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q14.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q14.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person A, A3, I3

Start of Block: Person A, A3, I4

Q15.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While walking by your office, your coworker overhears your conversation through the closed door. They stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to your conversation.

Later that night, your coworker tells a mutual colleague of yours what they learned.

Q15.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q15.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q15.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q15.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person A, A3, I4

Start of Block: Person B, A1, I1

Q16.1 Please read the following scenario:

Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells you about a personal medical issue he has.

Q16.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q16.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q16.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q16.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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Q18.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q18.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q18.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person B, A1, I3

Start of Block: Person B, A1, I4

Q19.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

*Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells you about a personal medical issue he has. **Later that night, you tell a mutual colleague what you learned.***

Q19.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q19.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q19.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q19.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q21.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q21.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q21.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person B, A2, I2

Start of Block: Person B, A2, I3

Q22.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert’s office, you happen to overhear his conversation through the closed door.

On a phone call that night, you tell your personal friend what you learned. Your friend lives overseas, and does not know Robert, his spouse, or anyone else at your workplace.

Q22.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q22.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q22.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q22.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q24.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q24.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Page Break

Q24.6 You will now be shown three alternate versions of the above scenario. Each one will have a different piece of information at the end, in bold.

Page Break

End of Block: Person B, A3, I1

Start of Block: Person B, A3, I2

Q25.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert’s office, you overhear his conversation through the closed door. You stop walking and get closer to the door in order to listen to his conversation.

You do not share the information you learned with anyone.

Q25.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q25.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q25.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q25.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q27.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q27.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person B, A3, I4

Start of Block: Person D, A1, I1

Q28.1 Please read the following scenario:

Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells another coworker, David, about a personal medical issue Robert has.

Q28.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel with the events described in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q28.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q28.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q28.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Page Break

Q28.6 You will now be shown three alternate versions of the above scenario. Each one will have a different piece of information at the end, in bold.

Page Break

End of Block: Person D, A1, I1

Start of Block: Person D, A1, I2

Q29.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells another coworker, David, about a personal medical issue Robert has.

David does not share the information he learned with anyone

Q29.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel with the events described in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q29.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q29.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q29.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert's privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert's privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert's privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert's privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person D, A1, I2

Start of Block: Person D, A1, I3

Q30.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells another coworker, David, about a personal medical issue Robert has.

On a phone call that night, David tells a personal friend what he learned. David's friend lives overseas, and does not know Robert, his spouse, or anyone else at David's workplace.

Q30.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being "very comfortable" and 7 being "very uncomfortable," how would you feel with the events described in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q30.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being "very right" and 7 being "very wrong," how would you describe David's actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q30.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being "very harmless" and 7 being "very harmful," how would you describe David's actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q30.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person D, A1, I3

Start of Block: Person D, A1, I4

Q31.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. Your coworker, Robert, tells another coworker, David, about a personal medical issue Robert has.

Later that night, David tells a mutual colleague what he learned.

Q31.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel with the events described in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q31.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q31.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q31.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person D, A1, I4

Start of Block: Person D, A2, I1

Q32.1 Please read the following scenario:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert’s office, another coworker, David, happens to overhear Robert’s conversation through the closed door.

Q32.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel with the events described in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q32.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q32.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q32.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q34.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q34.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q34.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert's privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert's privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert's privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert's privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person D, A2, I3

Start of Block: Person D, A2, I4

Q35.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While accessing the printer located near Robert’s office, another coworker, David, happens to overhear Robert’s conversation through the closed door.

Later that night, David tells a mutual colleague what he learned.

Q35.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel with the events described in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q35.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q35.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q35.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q36.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert's privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert's privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert's privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert's privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	○	○	○	○

Page Break

Q36.6 You will now be shown three alternate versions of the above scenario. Each one will have a different piece of information at the end, in bold.

Page Break

End of Block: Person D, A3, I1

Start of Block: Person D, A3, I2

Q37.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert’s office, another coworker, David, overhears his conversation through the closed door. David stops walking and gets closer to the door in order to listen to Robert’s conversation.

David does not share the information he learned with anyone.

Q37.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel with the events described in the above scenario?

	Very comfor table 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortabl e 2 (2)	A little comfortabl e 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortabl e 4 (4)	A little uncomfortabl e 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortabl e 6 (6)	Very uncomfortabl e 7 (7)
. (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q37.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q37.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q37.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert's privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert's privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert's privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert's privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person D, A3, I2

Start of Block: Person D, A3, I3

Q38.1 Please read the following scenario. Additional information has been added to the end, in bold:

Imagine you work in an office. During the day, your coworker, Robert, calls his spouse on the phone and discusses a personal medical issue he has. While walking by Robert’s office, another coworker, David, overhears his conversation through the closed door. David stops walking and gets closer to the door in order to listen to Robert’s conversation.

On a phone call that night, David tells a personal friend what he learned. David’s friend lives overseas, and does not know Robert, his spouse, or anyone else at David’s workplace.

Q38.2 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel with the events described in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q38.3 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q38.4 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe David’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q38.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate Robert’s privacy at all” and 4 being “violated Robert’s privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert’s privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert’s privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert’s privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert’s privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q39.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being "did not violate Robert's privacy at all" and 4 being "violated Robert's privacy a lot," how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate Robert's privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated Robert's privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated Robert's privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated Robert's privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: Person D, A3, I4

Start of Block: Attention check

Q40.1 If you look up on a clear day, what color is the sky?

- Blue (1)
- USA (2)
- Happy (3)
- Sandwich (4)

End of Block: Attention check

Start of Block: demographics

Q41.1 Please answer the following questions.

Q41.2 What is your age?

Q41.3 What is your gender?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)
- Other (3)

Q41.4 Please select your highest level of education.

- High school (1)
- Some college (2)
- Associate's degree or technical school (3)
- Bachelor's degree (4)
- Advanced degree (5)

Q41.5 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being "not at all religious/spiritual" and 4 being "very religious/spiritual," how would you describe your level of religiosity/spirituality?

	Not at all religious/spiritual 1 (1)	A little religious/spiritual 2 (2)	Somewhat religious/spiritual 3 (3)	Very religious/spiritual 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q41.6 On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being "very liberal" and 7 being "very conservative," how would you describe your political orientation?

	Very liber al 1 (1)	Somewhat liberal 3 (3)	A little liberal 2 (2)	Neither liberal nor conservative 4 (4)	A little conservative 5 (5)	Somewhat conservative 6 (6)	Very conservative 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q41.7 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being "not at all likely" and 4 being "very likely," how likely are you to discuss personal information with your coworkers in your own workplace?

	Not at all likely 1 (1)	A little likely 2 (2)	Somewhat likely 3 (3)	Very likely 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q41.8 What is your ZIP code?

End of Block: demographics

Start of Block: End of survey message

Q42.1 Thank you for participating in this survey!

If you have any questions about this project, including requesting a copy of the information sheet, please email sklitgaard@ucla.edu.

Please click the arrow below to be redirected to Prolific.

End of Block: End of survey message

Survey Material for Study 2

Start of Block: AnEvoApproach information sheet

[Research Information Sheet]

Q2 Do you consent to participate in this study?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

End of Block: AnEvoApproach information sheet

Start of Block: Captcha

Captcha Please click the box below

End of Block: Captcha

Start of Block: ProlificID

Q37 What is your Prolific ID? *Please note that this response should auto-fill with the correct ID*

End of Block: ProlificID

Start of Block: Introduction

Q34 In the following survey, you will be asked to read a scenario. After, you will be asked to respond to a set of questions related to the scenario.

End of Block: Introduction

Start of Block: AnEvoApproach Person A, A2, I1

1 Please read the following scenario: *Imagine you work in an office. During the day, you call your spouse on the phone and discuss a personal medical issue you have. While accessing the printer located near your office, your coworker happens to overhear your conversation through the closed door.*

1_comfort On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very comfortable” and 7 being “very uncomfortable,” how would you feel in the above scenario?

	Very comfortable 1 (1)	Somewhat comfortable 2 (2)	A little comfortable 3 (3)	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 4 (4)	A little uncomfortable 5 (5)	Somewhat uncomfortable 6 (6)	Very uncomfortable 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

1_wrong On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

1_harm On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

1_violate On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

4_wrong On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very right” and 7 being “very wrong,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very right 1 (1)	Somewhat right 2 (2)	A little right 3 (3)	Neither right nor wrong 4 (4)	A little wrong 5 (5)	Somewhat wrong 6 (6)	Very wrong 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

4_harm On a scale from 1 - 7, 1 being “very harmless” and 7 being “very harmful,” how would you describe your coworker’s actions in the above scenario?

	Very harmless 1 (1)	Somewhat harmless 2 (2)	A little harmless 3 (3)	Neither harmless nor harmful 4 (4)	A little harmful 5 (5)	Somewhat harmful 6 (6)	Very harmful 7 (7)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

4_violate On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being “did not violate my privacy at all” and 4 being “violated my privacy a lot,” how would you describe the above scenario?

	Did not violate my privacy at all 1 (1)	Violated my privacy a little 2 (2)	Violated my privacy somewhat 3 (3)	Violated my privacy a lot 4 (4)
. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

End of Block: AnEvoApproach Person A, A2, I4


Start of Block: AnEvoApproach Demographics

Q1 Please answer the following questions.


Q2 What is your age?

Q3 What is your gender?

- Male (1)



Q7 On a scale from 1 - 4, 1 being "not at all likely" and 4 being "very likely," how likely are you to discuss personal information with your coworkers in your own workplace?



End of Block: AnEvoApproach Demographics

Start of Block: Block 10

Errors (Optional) Did you notice any errors or issues with this survey that you would like to inform us about?

End of Block: Block 10

Start of Block: End of survey message

Q1 Thank you for participating in this survey! Please click the button below to be redirected to Prolific.

End of Block: End of survey message